Air Force Institute of Technology

AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations

Student Graduate Works

3-23-2018

Evaluating the Air Force Inspection System
Luis D. Rosado-Medina

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons
Recommended Citation
Rosado-Medina, Luis D., "Evaluating the Air Force Inspection System" (2018). Theses and Dissertations. 1859.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/1859

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.

EVALUATING THE AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM
THESIS
MARCH 2018
Luis D. Rosado-Medina, Captain, USAF
AFIT-ENS-MS-18-M-157

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United States
Government. This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to
copyright protection in the United States.

AFIT-ENS-MS-18-M-157

EVALUATING THE AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM
THESIS
Presented to the Faculty
Department of Operational Sciences
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Logistics & Supply Chain Management

LUIS D. ROSADO-MEDINA, MA
Captain, USAF

March 2018
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

AFIT-ENS-MS-18-M-157

EVALUATING THE AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM

Luis D. Rosado-Medina, MA
Captain, USAF

Committee Membership:

Maj. Timothy W. Breitbach, PhD
Advisor

William A. Cunningham, PhD
Reader

AFIT-ENS-MS-18-M-157
Abstract
SAF/IG implemented the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) in 2013 following a
USAFE pilot study into its potential for implementation across the Air Force. Using responsive
constructive evaluation and content analysis of interviews as a methodology, AFIS was
evaluated against the objectives laid out in AFPAD13-01. 18 interviews were conducted on 4
stakeholder groups across the inspection enterprise, which resulted in 4 overarching themes:
Culture Shifts, Self-Assessment, Higher Headquarters Relationships, and PAD Objectives. This
research allows SAF/IG to implement changes to future versions of AFIS that incorporates views
from the field.
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EVALUATING THE AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM

I. Introduction
Overview
Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG) implemented the Air Force
Inspection System (AFIS) in 2013 following a USAFE pilot study into its potential for
implementation across the Air Force. According to Air Force Program Action Directive 1301 (AFPAD13-01):
“The Inspector General (TIG) completed a comprehensive assessment of the
effectiveness and efficiency of the AF Inspection System. TIG found the system to be
wasteful, inadequate and unsustainable in the current and future resource
environment. Over time, AF organizations had created over 100 inspections requiring
350+ inspection days over a 5-year span for most wings. These inspections—80% by
AF Functionals, 20% by IG—were often done with inadequate cross-tell, resulting in
an unsustainable burden on inspectors and inspected units. In addition, TIG found the
system was not providing the kind of AF-wide unit performance data desired by AF
senior leaders. The current system also does not fully meet Title 10 requirements for
commanders and IGs to inspect and report on the efficiency, economy, state of
discipline, and readiness of AF units.”
As a result of this, SAF/IG implemented AFIS as a means to correct these deficiencies. This
program was designed to be a cultural change about getting Airmen to identify our problem
areas so that we can work on them collectively (Mueller, 2013).
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The intent of this research effort is to evaluate the program based on the objectives
laid out in AFPAD13-01. In the 4 years since implementation, the prevailing culture in the
Air Force to “embrace the red” (meaning to accept that there are deficiencies within our
programs that will not be instantly corrected) has had effects on operations, it benefits the Air
Force to determine what those effects have been.

Background
In 2012, Lt Gen Rogers, SAF/IG, declared that the current Air Force Inspection System
was unsustainable. “Given budget constraints, reduced manning, and increased taskings,
headquarters and wings will not have the money, personnel, or time to execute the current
system. And, we cannot solve our wings’ white-space problems simply by creatively
scheduling/organizing external inspections to reduce their duration and frequency; we must
fundamentally change the system.” (Rogers, 2012)
The 2010 governing guidance for inspector general activities spelled out broad categories
of inspections including: Limited Inspections, Federal Recognition Inspections, Biological Select
Agents and Toxins Inspections, Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel (NWRM) Inspections,
Wounded Ill, and Injured (WII) Facility Inspections, FAM Evaluations and Assessments, SelfInspections, Compliance Inspections (CI), Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI), Nuclear
Surety Inspections (NSI), Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections (NORI), Health Services
Inspections (HSI), Field Inspections, Inspector General Directed Investigations (IGDI), and
several other forms of audits (SAF/IGI, 2009). Within these broader categories of inspections
and activities, smaller inspections, audits, and staff assistance visits would occur as well.
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The burden of finding manning to conduct all these inspections, the cost of conducting all
of these inspections, and the workload on the wings due to all of these inspections led the Chief
of Staff of the Air Force in June of 2010 to direct all inspection agencies to map the current AF
inspection system with emphasis on identifying primary consumers of wing “whitespace”.
Whitespace was defined as time available to the wing not being consumed by other parties by
means of inspections, visits, or HHQ exercises. There was also an attempt to reemphasize and
reinvigorate the role of Gatekeepers, and develop and implement actions to increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of the entire AF inspection system (Paris, 2011).
A Tiger Team was established and determined that the typical wing experiences 500+
days of inspection related activities over a 5 year period of time and left no “whitespace” to try to
improve operations or train personnel in problem areas. Based on this finding, the Tiger Team
determined that all inspections would need to be routed through the IG at the wing (or
equivalent) level in order to deconflict the immense workload placed on units and inspectors,
with the exception of inspections that have by-law requirements to be conducted by non-IG
personnel.
Further, this team identified that coordination of the self-inspection data would be better
served by consolidating the multitude of self-generated spreadsheets floating around into a
system of record that could be analyzed at the MAJCOM/HAF level. MICT was realigned to
provide units in AF Reserve Command (AFRC) with a means to quickly determine what
checklists applied to each unit, what roles and responsibilities were needed, and the overall
process to follow (Craig, 2013). This system allows multiple personnel in each unit access to
populate the same checklist, provide input and feedback until the information is approved and
locked by a supervisor (Mejia, 2011).
3

The most important piece of AFIS, however is the Commander’s Inspection Program
(CCIP) and Unit Effectiveness Inspection (UEI) construct. The CCIP is composed of 2 pieces—a
wing-level inspection program and a self-assessment program (Figure 1). The self-inspection
program exists to provide the unit commander the capability to improve their unit where the
rubber meets the road. Any deficiencies should be detected and reported into MICT at the local
level. Waivers to requirements can be requested and approved at the appropriate level within
MICT. Further, as life in the squadron is fluid, so should their current state of compliance as
reporting is a continuous process. The wing level inspection program exists to assist commanders
in validating their self-assessment programs (HQ USAF, 2013).

Figure 1 – Commanders Inspection Program (HQ USAF, 2013)
The UEI was a significant change in focus for MAJCOM IGs and MAJCOM staffs. The
UEI validates and verifies a Wing’s CCIP and offers the MAJCOM Commander an independent
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assessment of the unit in 4 major graded areas: Executing the Mission, Improving the Unit,
Managing Resources, and Leading People (Figure 2).

Figure 2 – AFIS Major Graded Areas (MGA) and Sub-MGAs (HQ USAF, 2013)
These UEIs would also be conducted in a rotating manner, in order to reduce the overall
footprint needed for inspection AF-wide with a 24-30 month inspection cycle for Active-Duty
and AFRC Wings and a 48-60 month inspection cycle for ANG Wings. AFRC Wings will be
inspected by HQ AFRC and gaining MAJCOM IGs on a 48-60 month cycle. This results in a
UEI every 24-30 months based on a rotational schedule between AFRC and the gaining
MAJCOM (HQ USAF, 2013).
Thanks to the use of virtual tools such as MICT and IGEMS, inspections could be
continuous and further reduce the size of the inspection foot print. A continual evaluation period
is used to build a “photo-album” of a Wing’s performance throughout the inspection cycle.
5

Virtual inspections, MAJCOM FAM inputs, Wing* CC’s Inspection Reports (CCIR), MICT
data, Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS) data, and small-team on-site
visits are just some of the inspection methods which are used (Figure 3). A MAJCOM IGadministered survey of each inspected Wing is conducted and included in the Leading People
MGA. Finally, an on-site, capstone visit during which the MAJCOM IG conducts focus groups,
interviews, task evaluations, audits and observations to complete the UEI (HQ USAF, 2013).

Figure 3 – MAJCOM IG's UEI Flow (HQ USAF, 2013)

Purpose
The purpose of this research is to identify to what extent the changes that the Air
Force has made targeted the problems it initially identified. Further, it seeks to determine
what shortfalls remain and potentially identify fixes to fill those shortfalls. This has been a
6

dramatic change in mindset that we’ve asked Airmen to make, with emotions involved in
some cases. This change has its benefits and its costs. Four years after implementation, it is
time to decide how well the program has achieved its objectives.

Research Question and Investigative Questions
The research question to be answered is “How has the Air Force Inspection System succeeded in
achieving desired Program Action Directive objectives?” By taking a good look at the field, this
research seeks to determine where AFIS has succeeded and where changes could be
implemented to achieve the desired objectives. Specific investigative questions include:
1. How rigorous is the current implementation of AFIS in terms of providing analysis of the state
of the inspected unit?
2. To what extent does the current implementation of AFIS provide AF senior leaders with AFwide reporting IAW Title 10 requirements to report to the Congress on: readiness problems,
readiness assessments, combatant command assigned mission assessments (not within the
purview of AFIS), risk assessment of dependence on contractor support, combat support and
related agencies assessment, major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates?
3. Has there been a reduction in time spent preparing for inspection has AFIS achieved from the
previous model where units spent 350+ days over 5 years on inspection prep.
4. How much of the responsibility of inspection has been moved back to unit commanders as a
result of the implementation of AFIS?
5. In what ways can HHQ utilize system data to provide the field with actionable guidance to
meet HHQ priorities?
7

Research Focus
The research will focus on maintenance and mission support group squadrons from ACC
and AMC. Data will also be pulled from MICT in order to bolster the validity of qualitative data
pulled from subject matter experts. SAF/IG is sponsoring this research in order to see what
potential policy changes are available to better report the effectiveness of the Air Force.

Theoretical Lens
Lincoln and Guba’s responsive constructivist evaluation is used as a theoretical lens to
conduct this research. This theory proposes that program evaluation needs to take place in an
atmosphere where the key stakeholders are able to provide their input into the evaluation, versus
relying solely on the expertise of the evaluator in a vacuum (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). This lens
provides a basis to conduct the interview portion of this research.

Methodology
Chapter III discusses the qualitative and quantitative research methods used in
researching success in meeting objectives of AFIS. To ascertain the opinions and values of a
population, a qualitative research method was utilized to gain new insights from subject matter
experts (SMEs). 19 SMEs were interviewed at the program management, squadron, wing, and
MAJCOM IG level. The participants were asked questions in a semi-structured interview which
enabled immediate feedback. This method allowed for the asking of questions that evolved from
the interview, and provided clarification of answers. Data was collected via a digital recorder and
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the researcher took notes during the interviews. All recordings were transcribed and the
researcher coded and analyzed the data. Results were analyzed using descriptive statistics.
Quantitative data showing the number of observations that units reported and compared
to the overall rating of their most recent UEI was pulled from MICT. ANOVA analysis was
conducted to determine if there was a difference between groups that reported high number of
observations and groups that reported low numbers of observations. This was done in an attempt
to see if high levels of self-reporting actually resulted in a more robust UEI inspection.

Research Goal
The main implication is that this research better enables SAF/IG to implement AFIS in a
way that better meets the objectives assigned in AFPAD13-01. An improved reporting system
ensures the integrity of the inspection system by not only identifying and documenting
deficiencies and best practices, but also ensures Airmen expediently and efficiently correct
broken processes and other identified deficiencies (Johnson, 2013). Further, this research serves
as a reminder to the field that it is incumbent on us to evaluate the programs that we push down
to ensure that we are getting everything we were supposed to get.
In summary, personnel concerned with the efficiency and efficacy of our inspection
system could use this study and its results. The following chapters will provide a background of
pertinent literature, the methodology, and the results from the interviews. The concluding chapter
discusses the potential usage of the results from this research and new avenues of future research.
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II. Literature Review
Overview
Program evaluation is often cited as an important element in determining the value of a
program’s socio-economic effects, often to the point of declaring whether or not the program is
“successful” (Laihonen & Linzalone, 2015). Chapter 2 will establish the framework used to
conduct research on the Air Force Inspection System and also review literature and theoretical
frameworks used in program evaluation research. It is broken into two sections: discussion of
theory, and an Air Force document review to identify decision maker objectives.
The USAF, as a public institution, is often the subject of internal and external program
reviews and audits. These are often conducted unevenly, based on the expertise of the evaluators
(Cowin, 1996). The results of evaluations on various defense projects have lasting impact on the
readiness and effectiveness of the USAF. By evaluating the current practices utilized by SAF/IG,
we are making an attempt to meet the intent of the IG to “continuously improve the AFIS so
there is an ever-shrinking difference--both real and perceived--between mission readiness and
inspection readiness” (SAF/IGI, 2009)

Section I - Discussion of Theory
Ensuring that research is grounded in a solid framework provides researchers a roadmap
for the way ahead. In the case of program evaluation, several different approaches are available
each with its own benefits and shortcomings. The critical piece for the researcher is to have a
solid understanding of what those are when deciding what method to follow (Cowin, 1996). The
following paragraphs provide an overview of how academic research uses theory within the area
of program evaluation.
10

Fourth Generation Evaluation and the Responsive Model.
The most widely cited model on program evaluation is spelled out in Lincoln and Guba’s
1989 book Fourth Generation Evaluation. Their book is a critique on what they see as three
previous periods in the development of program evaluation: 1) Measurement, as exemplified in
the ideas of Scientific Management from the 1900s to 1930s. 2) Description, which described
patterns of strengths and weaknesses in regards to stated objectives and really set the stage for
program evaluation from the 1930s to 1950s. 3) Judgement, where objectives or goals were also
opened up to be evaluated from the 1960s to 1970s (Cowin, 1996).
Throughout all 3 periods there was an emphasis on maintaining a positivist world-view
when it came to evaluating programs. This emphasis on finding the “truth” often came at the
expense of ignoring problems of bias within research. This is not to say that other world-views
“solve” the issue of researcher or subject bias. However, it is acknowledged and steps are taken
to try to minimize any negative impact that bias will introduce (Kvale, 2007).
Lincoln and Guba had a number of critiques of the three previous periods. First, not
evaluating the values adopted by the evaluators led to issues where consensus could not be
reached, especially among disparate stakeholders. Lincoln and Guba described this as failing to
accommodate value-pluralism. Second, the managerial focus of evaluations had a tendency to
lead evaluations down a certain path, often pre-determined based on what management desired
the evaluation to conclude. There are many anecdotal accounts of leadership pushing evaluators
to certain conclusions about pet projects which show that this phenomenon is still very prevalent
today. Finally, Lincoln and Guba felt that the over commitment to a quantitative approach
removed context from the life of the program and resulted in weaker explanatory capabilities of
evaluation (Guba & Lincoln, 1989).
11

Lincoln and Guba recommend a fourth generation of evaluation to flow from this history:
responsive constructivist evaluation. Responsive evaluation was defined by Lincoln and Guba
this way:

"Responsive evaluation was so named by its originator, Robert Stake, to signal the idea
that all stakeholders put at risk by an evaluation have the right to place their claims,
concerns and issues on the table for consideration (response), irrespective of the value
system to which they adhere. It was created as the antithesis of preordinate evaluation,
which assumes the evaluator and the client together possess sufficient information and
legitimacy to design and implement an evaluation, without the need to consult other
parties...."
Constructivism was added to this framework to develop a methodology that accepted that there is
no objective, scientifically verifiable reality for humans to discover, and constructs would be
necessary to develop any new knowledge from evidence gathered in the field (Cowin, 1996). To
constructivists, how people view an object or event and the meaning that they attribute to it is
what matters (Rubin & Rubin, 2012).
The steps of responsive constructivist evaluation can be summarized as:
1. Identify stakeholders
2. Introduce claims across all stakeholder groups
3. Claims that cannot be resolved by stakeholders become the responsibility of the evaluator
to locate data for.
4. Negotiate among stakeholders for consensus (Cowin, 1996).
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Other Evaluation Models
The other mix of theories fall into one of three models: goal-based models, decisionmaking models, and connoisseurship models. Each has its benefit, but also have their limitations
that made them less suitable for this study.
Goal-based models are designed to measure programs against stated goals. Their major
limitation lies in the specificity of the goals at the time of formulation. There is a major
insensitivity to second and third order effects, and there is an assumption made that you can find
some form of quantitative measure that affords the researcher the capability to make an
assessment.
Decision-making models have the benefit of being utilized while the major decisions of
the program are being made. They tend to be quantitative and can have sophisticated
methodologies. They can be single or multiple criterion decision support tools that provide
decision makers with the data they need to make a quality decision. There are problems with
decision-making models, however. They assume that the researcher has developed all possible
alternatives and that decision makers have provided the researcher with all the pertinent values
and criteria needed to come to the “right” answer. Further, in large organizations, determining
who has the proper authority to make the decision is not always a straightforward process
(Cowin, 1996).
Connoisseurship models rely on the technical expertise of the evaluator. This has been
the preferred method of individual inspectors of the previous version of the Air Force Inspection
System. Emphasis is placed on the person chosen to conduct the evaluation as no two experts
will have the same value structures or weigh criterion equally. The major limitation of this model
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is that it becomes difficult to determine whether or not the evaluator’s perception is accurate
(Cowin, 1996).

Section II – Air Force Document Research
Implementation Guidance
Understanding the regulatory guidance that implemented AFIS is a key requirement in
conducting any sort of evaluation on that program. The configuration of AFIS is the
responsibility of SAF/IG, in coordination with SECAF and CSAF and is implemented from
guidance provided in AFPAD 13-01 using authorities listed in: SECAF and CSAF approved
Inspection System Guiding Principles, 10 USC § 8020 Inspector General, 10 USC § 8583
Requirement of Exemplary Conduct, AFMD 1-20, The Inspector General, 23 April 2008, AFPD
90-2, Inspector General-The Inspection System, 26 April 2006, AFI 90-201, The Air Force
Inspection System, 23 March 2012, and SAF/IG signed charter of the AFIS Implementation
Tiger Team, 12 March 2013.
The Commander’s Inspection Program (CCIP) is the foundation of the AFIS and is set up
with two key components: 1) An inspection program executed by the wing level IG with support
from subject-matter experts from the wing. 2) A self-assessment program utilizing the
Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) that reports compliance with requirements. AFIS
is structured to inspect and report in accordance with four key areas: Managing Resources,
Leading People, Improving the Unit, and Executing the Mission (HQ USAF, 2013). When the
system was implemented there were two primary lines of effort, establishing inspection
capability at the wing and headquarters actions to enable and support AFIS.
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Inspections conducted above the wing level are called Management Inspections and are
geared at inspecting selected Air Force and MAJCOM level programs. Unit Effectiveness
Inspections (UEIs) are levied against wings and wing equivalent organizations by the MAJCOM
IGs and the Air Force Inspection Agency, in the case of DRUs and FOAs. The intent of the UEI
is not to identify specific cases of non-compliance, but rather to determine the quality of the
CCIP for the wing commander. They are focused on helping the wing commander identify blind
spots, poorly focused or misaimed sensors within their CCIP (USAF, 2015).

TIG Briefs
The Inspector General regularly communicates with the field using TIG briefs, a
quarterly newsletter detailing developments in the area of inspection. During the formulation of
the current AFIS, Lt Gen Rogers wrote an article, dated March 2012, detailing the need for a
change to the system as the previous version did not meet the requirements of the Air Force. He
stated that the new system needed to strengthen the command function and effectiveness, and
needed to motivate and promote military discipline and unit performance (Rogers, 2012).
This message to the field set up his successor, Lt Gen Mueller, to begin the hard work of
pushing through AFIS and the UEI construct. He set the guiding principles that would be
embodied in AFIS in his first TIG article, dated May 2012, where he stated that the common
standards and goals would be:
•

Correcting a lack of self “policing” is critical to AF future

•

Inspection IS a command function

•

The IG is a special duty
15

•

Makes us Better

•

Airman’s time is the key issue

•

Functional/Command balance is “out of balance”

•

IG Inspection System is the vector

•

Cost of Compliance is the key variable

•

Squadron is the AF’s organizational building block

•

We need to be pit bulls
Several points from this article are now part of the core ethic of AFIS and the UEI

construct: self-assessment, inspection being a commander’s core responsibility, and compliance
being a risk assessment to the overall mission.
Contribution
This research aims to apply the responsive model to the status of the Air Force Inspection
System. The goal is to conduct semi-structured interviews in a way that allows for the
application of the input from previous interviews as well as allow the conversations to progress
organically. Based on the results, it should be readily apparent if the responsive model provides a
good framework to evaluate other Air Force programs.
Conclusion
This chapter laid out the supporting literature and framework for program evaluation and
the supporting documentation for the implementation of the AFIS. As seen in the reviewed
research, it is imperative to understand methodology involved in conducting a worthwhile
program evaluation. At the same time, it is necessary to have a firm understanding of the
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program to be evaluated in order to maintain credibility. Chapter 3 will delve into the
methodology to be utilized in this study.
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III. Methodology
Overview
Chapter 3 describes the qualitative approach taken to evaluate the Air Force Inspection
System. Section 1 provides a review of qualitative research, the responsive constructivist
evaluation methodology, and explains why this is the best method to evaluate the Air Force
Inspection System. Section 2 discusses the steps used to acquire data, the interview subjects and
guides, and the analysis process.

Section I – Qualitative Research – Responsive Constructivist Evaluation
Responsive constructivist evaluation was the primary tool that was used to conduct this
research. Responsive constructivist evaluation is orientated on program activities versus program
goals, and responds to the audience’s needs versus predetermined information categories.
Responsive constructivist evaluation was focused on by Guba and Lincoln in the 1980s, but was
more fully developed by Robert Stake, who was an early advocate of qualitative methods for
evaluating social programs (Shadish, Cook, & Leviton, 1991). Stake advocated for responsive
evaluation:
“An evaluation probably will not be useful if the evaluator does not know the interests
and language of his audiences. During the evaluation study, a substantial amount of time
may be spent learning about the information needs of the persons for whom the
evaluation is being done… To be of service and to empathize evaluation issues that are
important for each program, I recommend the responsive evaluation approach” (Stake,
1980).

18

This was the best approach for this research because the subject matter is of high interest
to many of the participants in the study, and it allowed a degree of flexibility needed to construct
the interview guides and develop the thematic codes necessary in conducting qualitative research
(Creswell, 2014).
Applied Framework
The steps required to complete a responsive evaluation in a culturally sensitive
framework have been summarized by Askew et al below (Askew, Beverly, & Jay, 2012):
1. Assemble the evaluation team. Attend to the sociocultural context of the evaluation by
assembling a team of evaluators who are knowledgeable of and sensitive to the context.
2. Engage stakeholders. From beginning to end, seek out and involve members from all
stakeholder groups, attending to distributions of power.
3. Identify evaluation purpose and intent. Examine the social and political climate of the
program and the community in which it operates paying particular attention to equitable
distribution of resources and benefits.
4. Frame the right questions. Using a democratic process, assess whether the evaluation
questions reflect the concerns and values of all significant stakeholders including the end
users.
5. Design the evaluation. Design comprehensive and appropriate evaluations that take
advantage of qualitative and quantitative methods to examine and measure important
cultural and demographic variables.
6. Select and adapt instruments. Instruments should be identified, developed, adapted and
validated for the target population, using culturally sensitive language.
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7. Collect the data. Select data collection methods that are appropriate and respectful of the
cultural context of the program and the target population.
8. Analyze the data. Involve representatives from various stakeholder groups, as cultural
interpreters, to review data and validate evaluators’ inferences and interpretations.
9. Disseminate and utilize results. Distribute findings broadly using multiple modalities and
in ways that are consistent with the original purpose of the evaluation and can be
understood by a wide variety of audiences.

Section II – Steps Taken
The approach taken had three significant steps (Figure 4). The preparatory actions
included receiving sponsorship from SAF/IG on the research topic, coordinating IRB exemption
status (see Appendix A for exemption determination letter), preparing the literature, selection of
interview subjects, and the first iteration of the interview guides. The most important phase of
the preparatory actions was in interviewee selection.

Prepatory
Actions

•Literature
Review
•Interview
Guide
Develpment
•Subject
Selection

Data
Collection

•Read ahead to
interviewees
•Phone
Interviews
•Data
Collection

Analysis

•Coding
•Narratives

Figure 4 – Process Flow
The Data Collection and Analysis phases included conducting the interviews, coding, and
the analysis required to get useable results from interview data. The results of this effort are
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detailed in chapters 4 and 5. The following section details the process followed to identify the
interview subjects.
Selection Criteria
This research focused on SMEs from Active Duty and Air National Guard units within
Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC). The first step was to
determine the right mix of SMEs in terms of level of involvement in AFIS. Four levels of input
for the CCIP were identified: MAJCOM IG, Wing commander, Squadron Commander, and
Program Manager (USAF, 2015). The scope was limited to squadrons within maintenance and
mission support groups. Those organization types are responsible for 35% of deficiencies on
checklist items (see Figure 5).

Figure 5 – Deficiencies by Functional Area (MICT) (Maj Jesse Wales, AFIA/ETA, 2016)
After narrowing the scope of potential unit types, a list of potential units was generated
utilizing PASCodesNet (which provides a list of all units in the AF) to generate a list of 2,031
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ACC active duty and guard units. With this list, the maintenance and mission support units were
filtered out, leaving 606 units. A random number generator (RNG) was applied and 9 ACC units
and 10 AMC units were selected while also applying a proportional quota for the level of
individual (MAJCOM IG, Squadron Commander, Wing Commander, or Program Manager). A
RNG was applied to unit type assignments (i.e. Logistics Readiness SQ, Component
Maintenance SQ, etc.) from the bases identified. If a base did not have a particular function (in
the case of contracted functions), the RNG was reapplied to correct. This resulted in the
following selections being made (Table 1):
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Table 1 – Interview Subjects
Interview

Position

Command

Base

Unit

1

PM

ACC Guard

TINKER

FSS

2
3

WING/CC
IG

NELLIS
SCOTT

WG
IG

4

IG

SCOTT

IG

5
6
7

PM
PM
CC

DOVER
MOODY
MOODY

CS
SFS
EMS

8

CC

TINKER

CES

9

PM
CC

11

PM

TRAVIS
Roland R. Wright
ANGB, Utah
Roland R. Wright
ANGB, Utah

MXS

10

ACC
AMC
AMC
GUARD
AMC
ACC
ACC
ACC
GUARD
AMC
AMC
GUARD
AMC
GUARD

12

IG

ACC

LANGLEY

IG

13
14
15
16
17
18

CC
PM
IG
IG
CC
CC

AMC
ACC
ACC
AMC
ACC
AMC

DOVER
LANGLEY
LANGLEY
SCOTT
LANGLEY
ROBINS

LRS
CONS
IG
IG
MXS
FSS

AMXS
LRS

Interview Guide and Process
After subjects were determined, they were contacted to determine availability and
whether they would consent. Interviews were semi-structured and conducted over the phone.
Audio was recorded as the subjects were all geographically separated from the interviewer. The
interview guide was divided into four different types based on the varying expertise expected
from respondents. The nature of assignments in the Air Force makes it likely that the individuals
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assigned to each position do not have equal levels of experience. Therefore it becomes necessary
to use the initial portion of the interview to gauge what level of experience that the individual has
in their job. The interview then progressed into topics that sought to answer the investigative
questions laid out. Those questions used the objectives laid out in AFPD13-01 as a starting point
(e.g. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their self-assessments?)
Based on the answers provided by interviewee’s, further inquiry followed along lines that
capitalized on the interviewee’s specific expertise (Kvale, 2007). After completing an initial set
of 4 pilot interviews, the interview guide based on the input of from the respondents. See the
initial set of interview guides in Appendix B.
Initial Coding
Prior to conducting the interviews, the researcher speculated what sort of responses
would be coming from the respondents based on the writing of Air Force officers in publications
like the TIG Briefs, and commentaries seen in the development of the literature review and prior
experience. Based on all of this, an initial listing of 38 generic sentiments was developed (Table
2):
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Table 2 – Expected Sentiments

Change in Culture
No Change in culture
Mindset still hasn’t changed
Mindset has changed
Not Ok with having write ups
Ok with having write ups
Not getting help with write ups
Help is provided with write ups
HHQ is not helpful with guidance
HHQ is helpful with guidance
Field fights every single write up
Field is understanding of write ups
Field does not understand process
Field does understand process
Culture has changed
Culture is in process of changing
Guidance is inadequate
Guidance is adequate
Functionals do not help

Expected Sentiments
Functionals do help
System does report Title 10 Requirements well
System does not report Title 10 Requirements well
AFIS increases workload over previous model
AFIS decreases workload over previous model
Inspection does not belong to commanders
Inspection does belong to commanders
Rigor is lacking in this inspection system
Rigor is present in this inspection system
We need more rigor
We need less rigor
CCIP is easily accomplished now
CCIP is very difficult to accomplish
Units are resigned to accomplish
Units are excited to accomplish
Self-Assessment is challenging to accomplish
Self-assessment is easy to accomplish
Training program managers is difficult to accomplish
Training program managers is easy to accomplish

Additionally a list of research question related sentiments were also developed in order to
aid in the content analysis of this research effort (Table 3):
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Table 3 – Research Question Sentiments
RQ Sentiments
Meeting PAD objectives
Not Meeting PAD objectives
AFIS reduces workload
AFIS does not reduce workload
Inspection is a commanders responsibility
Inspection is not a commanders
responsibility
Self-assessment is meeting rigor
requirement
Self-assessment is exceeding rigor
requirement

Self-assessment is not meeting rigor
requirement
There are many ways to improve guidance
through system
There are not many ways to improve guidance
through system
There are ways it improve guidance, just not
through the system

Pilot Interviews
Four interviews (one from each group) were selected as the pilot interviews and
additional inductive codes were developed. Inductive codes are developed after initial pilot
interviews are conducted, generalizing from those individual interviews expressed sentiments
onto the whole data set. Those inductive codes are below in Table 4.
Table 4 – Inductive Codes
Inductive Codes
AFIS increases redundancy
AFIS decreases redundancy
Risk based decision making is happening
Risk based decision making is not happening
AFIS stresses going through the chain
AFIS does not stress going through the chain
Expertise on staff is adequate
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Expertise on staff is lacking
AFIS does not increase or decrease workload
Self-assessment is not easy or challenging to accomplish
Training program managers is not hard or easy to do
SAPM role is challenging
SAPM role is not challenging
SAPM role requires more than half of duty day
SAPM role requires less than half of duty day
Wartime requirements not captured by communicators
Wartime requirements are captured by communicators
AFIS is vulnerable to comm out
AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out
Manning is adequate
Manning is not adequate

Coding Methodology
In order to accomplish coding, audio data was uploaded to Dedoose, a web-based
platform for performing qualitative analysis. At this point, excerpts of interviewee responses
could be created and coded. This allowed for coding to be accomplished in smaller batches and
increased reliability. Figure 6 is an example of a demo audio file where excerpts were created
and coded.
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Figure 6 – Demo Audio Coded
This methodology allowed for multiple codes to be applied to the same excerpts, as
multiple sentiments would be expressed in one question response.
Validity and Reliability
Shenton identified 14 techniques to ensure that validity remains high in qualitative
research studies. Validity is trying to answer the question “How congruent are the findings with
reality?” Table 5 details the tactics and means of implementation to ensure a high degree of
validity (Shenton, 2004).
Table 5 – Validity Tactics
Tactic
Using well established
research methods
Developing a familiarity of
the organizations culture
Random sampling

Method to implement tactic
Content and Thematic Analysis has been the preferred means
to conduct responsive evaluation (Cowin, 1996)
The researcher is a military professional with over 9 years
experience in the field and has an appreciation for the culture
of the Air Force.
Selection of units to interview was done using a random
number generator to maximize random sampling
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Triangulation

Tactics to help ensure honest
in informants
Frequent debriefing sessions

By examining data from MICT, IGEMS, conducting 18
interviews, and reviewing TIG documents, triangulation can
be achieved
In the selection process, the interviewees were given ample
opportunity to refuse to participate to ensure that only those
who were willing to participate did so.
Weekly sessions were conducted to ensure that interviewer
was staying on track and provided perspective as to findings

Qualitative reliability is defined as having a consistent approach across different
researchers and different projects (Creswell, 2014). Reliability was achieved by using the same
methodology to code the interviews. Excerpts were created from each response provided by the
interviewee. The coder then coded the particular excerpt in an effort to prevent being overloaded
by too much information. This methodology was applied to every interview. 368 total excerpts
were created from the 18 interviews. Other tactics to ensure reliability are in Table 6, from
Creswell, include:
Table 6 – Reliability Tactics
Tactic
Check transcripts to ensure there are no
mistakes in transcription
Ensure no drift in definition of codes

Method to implement tactic
Coding was accomplished directly from the
audio files, and quality of the recording was
tested prior to each interview
146 memos were written during coding
process to keep codes consistent

Analysis
The procedures utilized to accomplish the analysis follow Creswell’s process depicted in
Figure 7 (Creswell, 2014):
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Understand
Data

•Organize and
prepare data
•Get a general
sense of data

Code Data

•Open coding to
assign themes
•Axial coding to
determine
connections

Develop
Narratives

Interpret
Data

•Determine how
themes
interconnect to
answer RQs

•What are the
lessons learned?

Figure 7 – Analysis Process Flow (Creswell, 2014)

Throughout this process, quality checks need to occur to ensure that code integrity is
maintained throughout the research process. Normalized code counts and raw code counts were
used for reporting due to disparate size groups. The normalization function, an option in a variety
of Dedoose frequency charts, operates by assigning a weight of '1' to the class with the largest
number of members (basis class) and then assigns weights to the other classes as a function of
the numeric relation between the number of members in the class to that of the number of
members in the 'basis' class. These weights are then used to adjust the number of raw counts to
accomplish ratio equivalence across class for visualization. The weighted percentage is
calculated based on these adjusted counts (Dedoose, 2018).
For example, if we are interested in the relative percentage of codes applied for “manning
is not adequate” across groups, we calculate as follows in Table 7:
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Table 7 – Normalization Calculation
Groups

# of Class
Members

Assigned Weight (basis
class/class count)

Adjusted
Count (count
x weight)
3 (3 x 1)

Weighted %

1 (6/6)

Raw
Code
Count
3

Program
Managers
Squadron
Commanders
Wing
Commanders
IG Personnel

6 (tied for
basis)
6 (tied for
basis)
1

1 (6/6)

4

4 (4 x 1)

4.5%

6 (6/1)

11

66 (11 x 6)

74.5%

5

1.2 (6/5)

13

15.6 (13 x
1.2)
88.6 (sum of
adjusted
count)

17.6%

3.4%

Applying normalization to the wing commander group benefits the research by not allowing the
contribution of the group to be lost. This can be seen by comparing Figure 8 and Figure 9.

Raw Culture Totals

Raw PAD Objective Totals

100

100

80

80

60

60

40

40

20

20

0

Program Squadron
Wing
IG
Manager Commander Commander Personnel

0

Raw HHQ Relationship Totals

Raw Self-Assessment Totals

100

100

80

80

60

60

40

40

20

20

0

Program Squadron
Wing
IG
Manager Commander Commander Personnel

Program Squadron
Wing
IG
Manager Commander Commander Personnel

0

Program Squadron
Wing
IG
Manager Commander Commander Personnel

Figure 8 – Raw Theme Totals by Group
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Normalized PAD Objective
Totals

Normalized Culture Totals
140
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100
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0
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Wing
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Normalized Self-Assessment
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40
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Program
Squadron
Wing
IG Personnel
Manager Commander Commander

0
Program
Squadron
Wing
IG Personnel
Manager Commander Commander

Program
Squadron
Wing
IG Personnel
Manager Commander Commander

Figure 9 – Normalized Totals by Group
Report Comparisons
Additional statistical analysis was attempted to determine if there is a statistical
relationship between the results of a units last UEI and the current number of deficiencies noted
by that units self-assessment program. ANOVA techniques were attempted to see if there were
different groups within the 5 potential grade groups (Outstanding, Highly Effective, Effective,
Marginally Effective, and Unsatisfactory).
Data queried from the Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS) to get
AMCs and ACCs UEI results from 1 October 2013 to 1 October 2017. This resulted in a list of
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scores and wing designations. Data was requested from AMC and ACC IGI for report of
deficiencies self-reported through the self-assessment program.

Assumptions and Limitations
This research assumes that the personnel interviewed are representative of personnel in
the field that are an integral part of AFIS. It is also assumed that the data pulled from MICT is
accurate. Stating these assumptions allowed the researcher to generalize the results of the study
to ACC and AMC at large.
As to the data analysis, the following limitations applied: data analysis conducted by the
researcher meant that he or she must interpret the data, but the limitation of interpretation is
unavoidable (Charmaz, 2006). The researcher's non-presence in the in-person interviews may
provide a source of bias, and the use of semi structured interviews allows a variety of
information to come from the interviews which may not be comparable to other participants.
Other interview limitations included the indirect information filtered through the viewpoints of
the participants, and that not all people were equally perceptive and articulate (Creswell, 2014).
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IV. Analysis and Results
Overview
Interview and document data revealed that there are many areas where the inspection
system is meeting the intent of the PAD, however there are several aspects where improvement
could be made. Making a concerted effort towards changing the culture regarding inspection
between Active Duty and Guard Units would go a long in meeting the PAD objectives.
Targeting manning decisions to allow the staff to reap the benefits of the system data provided.
Additionally, educating commanders on the risk based methodology that AFIS depends on
would improve the overall quality of the system data available to the staff. The following
paragraphs discuss the results of the interview data analysis, answer the research and
investigative questions laid out in Chapter 1, provided additional insights garnered from the
research.

Report Comparison
ANOVA did not result in a useful product as there is simply not enough variation in the
outcome variable (Inspection Score). The AMC score report resulted in 21 inspections, all scored
as “Effective” (Table 8)
Table 8 – AMC Inspection Results
Unit
Inspection Window
**Masked** 07Dec2015 - 11Dec2015
09Jul2016 - 18Jul2016
**Masked**
**Masked** 20Feb2015 - 27Feb2015
**Masked** 02Mar2015 - 22May2017
**Masked** 01Feb2015 - 10Apr2017
13Jul2015 - 17Jul2015
**Masked**
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Final Score
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective

**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**

01Nov2016 - 30Jan2017
07Apr2016 - 18Apr2016
14Feb2015 - 01May2017
14Oct2015 - 24Oct2015
02Feb2015 - 10Feb2015
25Apr2016 - 31Jul2017
09May2016 23May2016
03Dec2016 - 12Dec2016
07Apr2016 - 18Apr2016
15Sep2014 - 12Dec2016
09Jan2015 - 11Jan2015
22Jun2015 - 26Jun2015
03Mar2015 - 22May2017
04Aug2015 - 07Aug2015
25Jan2016 - 29Jan2016

Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective

ACCs score report resulted in 43 inspections with four scores that were not “Effective”,
one “Outstanding” and three “Marginally Effective” (Table 9).
Table 9 – ACC Inspection Results
Unit
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**

Inspection Window
09Dec2013 13Dec2013
28Feb2016 05Mar2016
11Aug2014 18Aug2014
31Jul2016 06Aug2016
31Mar2014 05Apr2014
10Apr2016 16Apr2016
21Apr2015 25Apr2015
14Jun2015 - 19Jun2015
11Jun2017 - 17Jun2017
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Rating
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective

**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**

24Apr2016 30Apr2016
03Nov2016 10Nov2016
22Feb2015 28Feb2015
10Sep2017 16Sep2017
24Feb2017 26Feb2017
03Mar2017 05Mar2017
28Feb2017 02Mar2017
15Sep2014 23Sep2014
23Oct2016 29Oct2016
08Nov2015 13Nov2015
09Feb2017 15Feb2017
28Feb2016 05Mar2016
23Aug2015 29Aug2015
24Sep2017 30Sep2017
22Mar2015 28Mar2015
12Mar2017 18Mar2017
31Jan2016 - 06Feb2016
13Mar2016 19Mar2016
16Nov2015 20Nov2015
17Sep2017 23Sep2017
13Sep2015 19Sep2015
17Sep2017 23Sep2017
36

Outstanding
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Marginally
Effective

**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**
**Masked**

01Nov2015 07Nov2015
28Feb2016 05Mar2016
01Jun2015 - 17Jun2015
05Jun2017 - 16Jun2017
14Nov2016 18Nov2016
31Mar2014 05Apr2014
10Apr2016 16Apr2016
01Nov2015 07Nov2015
10Jan2016 - 16Jan2016
14Nov2016 18Nov2016
14Nov2016 18Nov2016
14Nov2016 18Nov2016

Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Marginally
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Effective
Marginally
Effective

As a result of only having 6% of inspections earning scores outside of “Effective”, it
would not be feasible to interpret an ANOVA result on these groups. This does highlight a
weakness in the Air Force’s compliance reporting: with 94% of units receiving a middle score,
defending this scoring system to outside agencies would be difficult, especially if that outside
agency attempts a similar

Themes Analysis
Interviews were coded according to the codes listing. This provided a way to tally the
amount of times a code was used or referenced and provided a means to determine which theme
was most important. Codes were then arranged into themes and initial statistics were looked at to
determine relative importance of each theme. Table 10 shows the theme list totals.
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Table 10 – Thematic Statistics and Total Coding Totals
Theme

Theme Total Theme % Code
Change in Culture
No Change in Culture
Mindset still hasn't changed
206
24.55%
Mindset has changed
Not Ok with having writeups
Ok with having writeups

Culture

HHQ Relationship

PAD Objectives

Self Assessment

Theme Totals

209

172

252

24.91%

Not Getting help with writeups
Help is provided with writeups
HHQ is not helpful with guidance
HHQ is helpful with guidance
Field fights every single write up
Field is understanding of write ups
Field does not understand process
Field does understand process
Guidance is inadequate
Guidance is adequate

20.50%

System does report Title 10 Requirements well
System does not report Title 10 Requirements well
AFIS increases workload over previous model
AFIS decreases workload over previous model
Inspection does not belong to commanders
Inspection does belong to commanders
Meeting PAD objectives

30.04%

Rigor is lacking in this inspection system
Rigor is present in this inspection system
We need more rigor
We need less rigor
CCIP is easily accomplished now
CCIP is very difficult to accomplish
Units are resigned to accomplish
Units are excited to accomplish
Self Assessment is challenging to accomplish
Self Assessment is not easy or challenging to accomplish
Self assessment is easy to accomplish
Training program managers is difficult to accomplish
Training program managers is not hard or easy to do

839

Total Code
22 Culture has changed
8 Culture is in process of changing
19 AFIS increases redundancy
35 AFIS reduces redundancy
8 Risk based decisionmaking is happening
6 Risk based decision making is not happening
Culture Totals
3 Functionals do not help
16 Functionals do help
19 AFIS stresses going through chain
29 AFIS does not stress going through chain
4 There are many ways to improve guidance through system
11 There are not many ways to improve guidance through system
11 There are ways to improve guidance, just not through system
19 Expertise on staff is adequate
10 Expertise on the staff is lacking
7
HHQ Totals
4 Not meeting PAD objectives
14 AFIS reduces workload
23 AFIS does not reduce workload
8 AFIS does not increase or decease workload
2 Inspection is a commanders responsibility
17 Inspection is not a commanders responsibility
24
PAD Objectives Totals
21 Training program managers is easy to accomplish
15 Self assessment is meeting rigor requirement
16 Self assessment is not meeting rigor requirement
2 Self assessment is exceeding rigor requirement
8 SAPM role is challenging
15 SAPM role is not challenging
6 SAPM role requires more than half of duty day
6 SAPM role requires less than half of duty day
22 War time requirement not captured by communicators
16 War time requirement is captured by communicators
5 AFIS is vulnerable to comm out
7 AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out
5 Manning is adequate
Manning is not adequate
Self-Assessment Totals

Figure 10 provides a comparison of the total code count by theme by groups. Based on
the strict totals, the majority (30%) of the codes come from the Self-Assessment codes and the
smallest contribution (20%) come from the PAD Objectives codes.
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Total
18
31
17
12
20
10
206
12
13
25
1
5
5
11
3
5
209
29
4
24
2
18
3
172
3
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5
1
15
2
3
5
7
5
2
0
10
31
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Figure 10 – Code Totals by Theme
Within the Self-Assessment theme, there were three sub themes that emerged as strong
findings: Rigor, Organizational Implementation, and Individual Implementation. Of the 252 SelfAssessment Theme code applications, 91 (36%) came from the Rigor sub theme, 119 (47%)
came from the Organizational Implementation sub theme, and 42 (16%) came from the
Individual Implementation sub theme. Figure 11 provides normalized counts of the code
occurrences within each of the sub themes.
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Figure 11 – Normalized Sub Theme Counts

Results
Once all of the interviews were coded, tables organized around whether or not the theme
was treated positively or negatively by the interviewee were generated. The purpose was to see
the overall impression that groups have towards the efficacy of AFIS. For example, comparing
tables of Self-Assessment codes produces Figure 12:

40

120

Self Assessment Codes
Manning is adequate
AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out
War time requirement is captured by communicators
SAPM role requires less than half of duty day
SAPM role is not challenging
Self-assessment is exceeding rigor requirement
Self-assessment is meeting rigor requirement
Training program managers is easy to accomplish
Training program managers is not hard or easy to do
Self assessment is easy to accomplish
Self Assessment is not easy or challenging to accomplish
Units are excited to accomplish
CCIP is easily accomplished now
We need less rigor
Rigor is present in this inspection system
0
Total Disagree

5

10

15

20

25
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35
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Figure 12 – Self-Assessment Sentiments
Figure 12 indicates that the Air Force does not man the inspection system in an adequate
fashion, being identified 31 times. It also says that the Air Force, over all groups, is meeting the
rigor requirements. There were 3 neutral categories of response within this particular theme.
They were used once it was determined that it was a repeated sentiment response.
Code co-occurrence was also examined. This looks at the excerpts where multiple codes
are attached and counts the co-occurrence of 2 codes. Table 11 is a portion of the entire code co41

occurrence chart. This metric pinpointed which codes were good candidates for combining or
were more important to the overall theme. It also assisted in ensuring reliability as shifts in code
meaning can be identified when unlike codes become more prevalent together. This acts as a
trigger for the researcher to go back and ensure that coding those excerpts that way was
appropriate.
Table 11 – Portion of Code Co-Occurrence Table
S13 - Training program managers is
easy to accomplish

7

2

1

1

3

1
1
1
3

1
1
2

Table 11 shows that there were 7 instances where SAPM role is challenging intersected
with AFIS does not reduce workload. Those 2 codes were identified during the initial coding
session as most likely being identified together.
Investigative Question #1
How rigorous is the current implementation of AFIS in terms of providing analysis of the state of
the inspected unit?
This was a critical investigative question. As a result, a larger series of codes was
developed along with three sub themes to help in answering the question from the position of
experts that use this system. The overall result of asking whether or not self-assessment as
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1

3
2
2

S12 - Training program managers is
difficult to accomplish

S14 - Self-assessment is meeting
rigor requirement

3

S12a - Training program managers
is not hard or easy to do

S15 - Self-assessment is not
meeting rigor requirement

2

S16 - Self-assessment is exceeding
rigor requirement

1

2
1
3

S17 - SAPM role is challenging

1

S18 - SAPM role is not challenging

1

1

S19 - SAPM role requires more
than half of duty day

3

S20 - SAPM role requires less than
half of duty day

1

1

S21 - War time requirement not
captured by communicators

1

1
2

S22 - War time requirement is
captured by communicators

2
23
1
4
5

9
2

S23 - AFIS is vulnerable to comm
out

11
1
3
3
1

S24 - AFIS is not vulnerable to
comm out

4

S25 - Manning is adequate

1
1

S26 - Manning is not adequate

P06 - Inspection does belong to
commanders

3
3

S08 - Units are excited to
accomplish

C01 - Change in Culture
P09 - AFIS reduces workload
P10 - AFIS does not reduce workload
P10a - AFIS does not increase or decease workload
P11 - Inspection is a commanders responsibility
C02 - No Change in Culture
C03 - Mindset still hasn't changed
C04 - Mindset has changed
C05 - Not Ok with having writeups
C06 - Ok with having writeups
C07 - Culture has changed

1

currently implemented throughout the units is that we are meeting a perceived self-assessment
requirement. There is some indication that we could benefit from integrating more rigor into the
self-assessment process, but there is also an indication that units are not eager to take on the
additional workload to accomplish this.
Examining the rigor component of this question requires a look at the rigor components
of the self-assessment codes. Figure 13 gives the rigor themed normalized code counts across
groups. The program managers and IG personnel give high levels of agreement that we are
meeting the rigor requirement as stated in the AFI.

Normalized Rigor Code Counts
War time requirement is captured by
communicators
War time requirement not captured by
communicators
Self assessment is exceeding rigor
requirement
Self assessment is not meeting rigor
requirement
Self assessment is meeting rigor requirement
We need less rigor
We need more rigor
Rigor is present in this inspection system
Rigor is lacking in this inspection system

0
Wing Commander

2

Squadron Commander

4

6

Program Manager

Figure 13 – Normalized Rigor Code Counts
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8
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IG
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Figure 14 gives an indication as to why units are not eager to attempt to improve the
system at their level. The primary reason is Wing Commanders and IG personnel believe that the
manning associated in AFIS (SAPMs, Wing IG offices, MAJCOM IG offices, etc.) is
insufficient to complete the job now.

Normalized Organization Implementation Code Counts
Manning is not adequate
Manning is adequate
Units are excited to accomplish
Units are resigned to accomplish
CCIP is very difficult to accomplish
CCIP is easily accomplished now
Self assessment is easy to accomplish
Self Assessment is not easy or challenging to
accomplish
Self Assessment is challenging to accomplish
0
Wing Commander

10

20

Squadron Commander

30

40

Program Manager

50
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70

IG

Figure 14 – Normalized Organization Implementation Code Counts
Figure 15 is a representation of the view from the individuals that do the leg work of the
inspection system. There is a wide disparity of how much daily input goes into a self-assessment
program, but there is wide agreement between Program Managers, Squadron Commanders, and
Wing commanders that the SAPM role is challenging.
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Normalized Individual Implementation Counts
SAPM role requires less than half of duty day
SAPM role requires more than half of duty day
SAPM role is not challenging
SAPM role is challenging
Training program managers is easy to
accomplish
Training program managers is not hard or easy
to do
Training program managers is difficult to
accomplish
0
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Figure 15 – Normalized Individual Implementation Counts

Program Managers
Program managers believe that the self-assessment is meeting the rigor requirement
needed to provide adequate information about the status of their unit’s compliance. There were
no negative codes associated with program managers on this particular topic. When asked
whether or not there was rigor in the responses, there were slightly more negative responses
expressed. Figure 16 gives the Self-Assessment theme codes arranged by
agreement/disagreement.
As to the difficulties associated with running a self-assessment program, the codes
captured a sense that it was moderately difficult to accomplish. This can be seen in Figure 16, in
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the codes CCIP is easily accomplished now, Units are excited to accomplish, Self-Assessment is
not easy or challenging to accomplish, and Self-Assessment is easy to accomplish.

Program Manager Self-Assessment Codes
Manning is adequate
AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out
War time requirement is captured by communicators
SAPM role requires less than half of duty day
SAPM role is not challenging
Self-assessment is exceeding rigor requirement
Self-assessment is meeting rigor requirement
Training program managers is easy to accomplish
Training program managers is not hard or easy to do
Self assessment is easy to accomplish
Self Assessment is not easy or challenging to…
Units are excited to accomplish
CCIP is easily accomplished now
We need less rigor
Rigor is present in this inspection system
0

1

Program Manager Disagree

2

3
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5
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7

8

9

10

Program Manager Agree

Figure 16 – Program Manager Self-Assessment Codes
There were some differences in opinion depending on how much experience program
managers had in program evaluation. A newer SAPM had this to say about the difficulty in
running a newer program:
"I would say my biggest challenge is the system. I feel like I can navigate it well
enough, but telling where my people are at, and figuring out what questions they've
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answered and what checklists they've completed, and all the associated
management related is my biggest challenge right now."
This SAPM felt that determining where their program managers are in terms of meeting
their reporting obligations can be a real challenge. They have the support of their local IG team
to help them navigate MICT, but there is still a pretty steep learning curve for someone who has
not spent a lot of time in program management/evaluation.
A more experienced SAPM looked at the inspections from the MAJCOM and Wing
differently:
"I don’t call them inspections, we get an opportunity to educate the unit, help identify
their blind spots, do some risk based sampling in areas and programs that their commander
should be aware of, educate them on things that, hey this is where you could do better, and also
point out any weaknesses or problems in their programs so they can improve."
This more experienced program manager views the MAJCOMs role to assess the wings
inspection program, not to inspect it. The key difference is that assessment provides the unit an
opportunity to improve, where inspection happens in a moment in time.

Squadron Commanders
Squadron commanders view the current state of the self-assessment component of AFIS
as meeting the stated objectives, however they all believe that there is ample room for rigor to be
increased in the system. A squadron commander expressed that by only going in 2 times a year,
they were much more motivated to ensure that the entries that were put into the self-assessments
were of high quality. Doing them monthly invites a level of complacency that is difficult to ferret
out, especially in the absence of a strong outside look:
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"Overall we had better rigor when we only had to do this in September and
March, and the reason for that is because it’s so run of the mill now, that we don't
feel we have to try that hard."

Squadron Commander Self-Assessment Codes
Manning is adequate
AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out
War time requirement is captured by communicators
SAPM role requires less than half of duty day
SAPM role is not challenging
Self-assessment is exceeding rigor requirement
Self-assessment is meeting rigor requirement
Training program managers is easy to accomplish
Training program managers is not hard or easy to do
Self assessment is easy to accomplish
Self Assessment is not easy or challenging to accomplish
Units are excited to accomplish
CCIP is easily accomplished now
We need less rigor
Rigor is present in this inspection system
0

1

Squadron Commander Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Squadron Commander Agree

Figure 17 – Squadron Commander Self-Assessment Codes
An examination of Figure 17 shows that there was no agreement with the sentiment that
we apply too much rigor to the system. There was also a neutral response that the AF is
exceeding the rigor requirement.
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Wing Commanders
Wing commanders are extremely skeptical regarding the amount of rigor being applied in
self-assessment (Figure 18). They view these commander programs as needing to have some sort
of strong guidance from HHQ to ensure that the right sorts of activities are regarded as being
“above the line” activities. When asked to rate how he viewed self-assessment being conducted
in the squadrons, this wing commander had this to say:
“Very hit or miss. Its very Commander dependent, like everything is. But the
commander only has so much time and energy to focus on things. So, to the
extent that a commander focuses on it you're going to get good stuff out of it. But
to the extent that a commander is doing other things that might be just as
important or more so at the time and you're depending on that frontline guy to fill
out the checklist right, that's when you see a lot of unidentified non-compliance
start creeping in”
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Wing Commander Self-Assessment Codes
Manning is adequate
AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out
War time requirement is captured by communicators
SAPM role requires less than half of duty day
SAPM role is not challenging
Self-assessment is exceeding rigor requirement
Self-assessment is meeting rigor requirement
Training program managers is easy to accomplish
Training program managers is not hard or easy to do
Self assessment is easy to accomplish
Self Assessment is not easy or challenging to accomplish
Units are excited to accomplish
CCIP is easily accomplished now
We need less rigor
Rigor is present in this inspection system
0

2

Wing Commander Disagree

4

6

8

10

12

Wing Commander Agree

Figure 18 – Wing Commander Self-Assessment Codes
Inspector General Personnel
IG personnel are much more evenly split as to whether or not there is sufficient rigor in
the inspection system (Figure 19). They do agree that the amount of rigor that is present in the
system is sufficient to meet the requirement as it is currently laid out, however. There is also a
huge concern that the amount of manning that is present within the inspection enterprise is
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insufficient to meet the need of eliminating the blind spots that are present in every unit. One IGI
member had this to say on the topic:
“Due to manning cuts at the various 2 letter levels, Continual Eval is not
occurring in a robust enough fashion and we’re concerned that the issues that are
being identified by the field that could have policy solutions are not being
addressed by the staff.”

IG Personnel Self-Assessment Codes
Manning is adequate
AFIS is not vulnerable to comm out
War time requirement is captured by communicators
SAPM role requires less than half of duty day
SAPM role is not challenging
Self-assessment is exceeding rigor requirement
Self-assessment is meeting rigor requirement
Training program managers is easy to accomplish
Training program managers is not hard or easy to do
Self assessment is easy to accomplish
Self Assessment is not easy or challenging to accomplish
Units are excited to accomplish
CCIP is easily accomplished now
We need less rigor
Rigor is present in this inspection system
0

2

IG Disagree

4

6

IG Agree

Figure 19 – IG Personnel Self-Assessment Codes
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Overall
The Air Force is meeting a perceived self-assessment rigor requirement. There is some
indication that there could benefit from integrating more rigor into the self-assessment process,
but there is also an indication that units are not eager to take on the additional workload to
accomplish this.
Investigative Question #2
To what extent does the current implementation of AFIS provide AF senior leaders with
AF-wide reporting IAW Title 10 requirements to report to the Congress on: readiness problems,
readiness assessments, combatant command assigned mission assessments (not within the
purview of AFIS), risk assessment of dependence on contractor support, combat support and
related agencies assessment, major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates?
There is disagreement between IG personnel and Wing Commanders on whether or not
Title 10 requirements are being met. Figure 20 shows the overall count of expressed
agreement/disagreement from the stakeholder groups on the code “Does the AF meet its Title 10
requirements for reporting?”
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System does report Title 10 requirements
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Squadron Commander
Program Manager
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Figure 20 – System does report Title 10 requirements
Program Managers
AFI 90-201 require commanders to appoint Program Managers to record self-assessments
and appoint other assessors to conduct assessments based on the communicators assigned. They
act as a primary quality control for the assessments conducted throughout the unit before they
reach the commander for approval. Thus, these individuals are in a unique position within the
unit’s inspection regime and possess key insights at the unit level.
Looking at the rates of positive and negative response from program managers to
questions geared at this IQ gives the overall impression that there is a slightly positive
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impression that the Air Force is meeting its Title 10 responsibilities. Figure 21 below explains in
greater detail the particular code counts.

Program Manager PAD Objective Sentiments
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

AFIS decreases Inspection Meeting PAD AFIS reduces AFIS does not Inspection is a
workload over does belong to objectives
workload
increase or commanders
previous
commanders
decease
responsibility
model
workload
Program Manager Agree

Program Manager Disagree

Figure 21 – Program Manager PAD Objective Sentiments
Program managers largely acknowledge that AFIS now provides the commander of the
unit much more of an up to date understanding of the status of the compliance programs s/he is
responsible for. This fits very much in line with meeting PAD objectives and allows for accurate
reporting to the Congress IAW Title 10. One program manager described the benefits of the
current system over the previous system this way:
"I think this system makes the commander maintain a higher knowledge level of
his squadron throughout the year, versus the old system where they didn’t really
find out until right before the inspection"
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Squadron Commanders
Squadron commanders were in a better position to answer specifically whether or not
Title 10 requirements were being accomplished. The overall sentiment regarding Title 10
requirements was negative, by more than 2 to 1. Looking at the overall PAD objectives,
however, show that squadron commanders are more positive in thinking that AFIS is meeting its
PAD objectives. There is a strong sentiment that the current inspection model increases workload
over the previous model, as seen inFigure 22.

Squadron Commander PAD Objective Sentiments
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

System does
AFIS
Inspection Meeting PAD AFIS reduces AFIS does not Inspection is a
report Title 10 decreases does belong objectives
workload
increase or commanders
Requirements workload over
to
decease
responsibility
well
previous
commanders
workload
model
Squadron Commander Agree

Squadron Commander Disagree

Figure 22 – Squadron Commander PAD Objective Sentiments
The main problem squadron commanders have with believing that AFIS is an
improvement on reporting title 10 requirements was summed up by a commander below:
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"If we're trying to report on readiness, that’s why we have the ART,
SORTS, DRRS, AF-IT, all that kinda of stuff. And that’s not inspectable
as far as compliance goes. So I don't know if... I think they're cousins, but
I don't think they're brothers."
They view all of the actions conducted by the wing IG and MAJCOM IG and don’t see
where these compliance-focused inspections equate to providing readiness data that is required.
The preponderance of operational communicators are geared at answering whether or not units
stay within the limits of what’s provided by AFI, and do not address the detailed activities that
are requested through ART, SORTS, DRRS, AF-IT, etc. The by-law communicators are even
more focused on the compliance activities that the individuals that are appointed to positions of
responsibility have taken. As a result, AFIS has not made a difference in reporting readiness and,
as it is required to report to the Wing on a monthly basis, takes more of a commander’s time than
the previous model did.
Wing Commanders
Wing Commanders tend to be ambivalent as to whether or not we are meeting Title 10
requirements or PAD objectives (Figure 23). They are much more of the opinion that AFIS
increases the workload on their staffs to accomplish inspection, however.
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Wing Commander PAD Objective Sentiments
5
4
3
2
1
0

System does
AFIS
Inspection Meeting PAD AFIS reduces AFIS does not Inspection is a
report Title 10 decreases does belong objectives
workload
increase or commanders
Requirements workload over
to
decease
responsibility
well
previous
commanders
workload
model
Wing Commander Agree

Wing Commander Disagree

Figure 23 – Wing Commander PAD Objective Sentiments
A wing commander had this to say when asked as to whether or not Title 10 objectives
were being met:
“I would say no from those kinds of areas. We're more in line when it comes to by
law programs and inspections that need to be done. In those areas that actually
does a good job. My IGI breaks out all the inspections that we're going to do
throughout the year and it clearly delineates which ones are by law inspections
that we got to get done. With that we prioritize appropriately and get those
inspections done. To the extent that there are other title 10 things, like you
mentioned reporting on readiness and some of those other things, it has not been
my experience at those things lend themselves, particularly readiness, to the IG
process.”
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Inspector General Personnel
IG personnel were strongly of the opinion that AFIS does not meet Title 10 requirements
for readiness reporting (Figure 24). Further they were even more strongly of the opinion that
AFIS is not meeting its PAD objectives as defined. Many of the individuals interviewed from the
different IG staffs were very excited to describe the newer readiness exercises that are being
rolled out over the next few years.

IG Personnel PAD Objective Sentiments
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report Title 10 decreases does belong objectives
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Requirements workload
to
decease responsibility
well
over previous commanders
workload
model
IG Agree

IG Disagree

Figure 24 – IG Personnel PAD Objective Sentiments
These individuals recognized that there is a significant gap in the system that they hope to
fill by reintroducing readiness inspections. The understanding is that the current version of AFI
90-201 does have readiness inspection requirements, however they are at the discretion of the
wing commander. Therefore, many commanders are taking the risk of only accomplishing
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smaller taskings to reduce the overall cost in time and money that a full-up inspection would
incur.
Overall
There is an agreement between IG personnel, squadron commanders, and wing
commanders that Title 10 readiness reporting requirements are not being met with the current
implementation of AFIS. This sentiment is best summed up by an IG member
“I think there has been some concern on whether or not this system is able to give
a good read to senior leaders on whether or not the wings are able to do what they
need to do. Now having said that I think the senior leadership is a little bit
culpable in not answering the question, ready for what?”
Investigative Question #3
Has there been a reduction in time spent preparing for inspection that AFIS achieved
from the previous model where units spent 350+ days over 5 years on inspection prep.
This particular question can be answered by focusing on the culture-themed codes. By
looking to see if there is an acknowledgement of a cultural shift, then we would see a reduction
in time spent on “inspection prep”. As culture takes years to move in any direction, we are more
likely to see the climate change first, which is what we see when examining the agreement and
disagreement codes between all stake holder groups. Figure 25 shows that the IG and Wing
Commander groups view the culture as largely the same as before the implementation of AFIS,
where Squadron Commanders and Program Managers see that there has been a change in culture
and the way they approach inspection.
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Normalized Percentage of Culture Codes by Group
IG Personnel
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Figure 25 – Normalized Percentage of Culture Codes by Group

Program Managers
Program Managers tend to respond positively that the culture has changed in the Air
Force when it comes to inspection prep and the nature inspection in general by about a 2 to 1
ratio, as can be seen in Figure 26. They also agree that there is a reduction in redundancy in
inspection, now that gatekeepers are in place to try to de-conflict inspections from within the AF
and also from outside agencies. One program manager gave this insight:
“My impression is that outside agencies are using the gatekeeper process which
helps limit and de-conflict the number of inspections that we are faced with.
Where possible, the agencies are furnished with preexisting data from selfassessment that also helps in limiting the redundancy of inspections from outside
agencies.”
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Program Manager Culture Sentiments
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Figure 26 – Program Manager Culture Sentiments
Squadron Commanders
Squadron Commanders are very much of the opinion that the overall culture and mindset
around inspection has changed in accordance with the PAD objectives (Figure 27). They
acknowledge that day to day actions are simply documenting the mission and do not consider the
effort made in that documentation to be “inspection prep”. One squadron commander summed
up the effort this way:
“Its leadership walking around and making sure that were in accordance with and
doing things the right way. It’s a little bit old school. We're holding folks
accountable for using their tech data, and doing the right steps and using the right
tools, and that’s where it starts. Its start with that discipline and accountability. No
inspection system is going to work if you don’t have that".
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Squadron Commander Culture Sentiments
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Figure 27 – Squadron Commander Culture Sentiments
Wing Commanders
Wing Commanders view this issue of inspection prep differently than the squadron
commanders. As they are required to staff the inspector general position “out of hide”, they are
finding that finding qualified personnel to step into the role of inspector is eating up the time
savings that they were supposed to receive from not “preparing”. Further the monthly CIMB
requirement is non-trivial for the wing as a whole. A wing commander delved into the topic of
second order effects from pulling manpower from organizations to fill what they view as a tax:
“… but the second and third order effects of taking this high man hour intensive
inspection on at the wing level, and doing it out of hide is that other things where
you pulled these bodies from, their workload goes up. So, my IGI is populated by
two people from The Defenders, 2 TSgts that made master sergeant from the
defenders, so that's work that ain't being done down in security forces. My chief
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of IGI comes from one of the medical squadrons, a major completely out of hide
and that's work that ain't being done down there. That's the other workload that's
affected that isn't captured well.”
There was consensus that, at the unit level, the culture of preparing for inspection has
diminished, however there are concerns at each unit as well about what this does:
“I think that part of it worked pretty much as required or as advertised. But just
because less prep means you're going to end up with more time to be ready. I
think there’s still in my mind an open question of Commander's inspecting
themselves and finding blind spots. Part of prepping for the IG to come was that
you didn't know what you didn't know, and the unknown unknowns as the former
Secretary of Defense said, so you try to find all the unknown unknowns as best
you can. Now when you're inspecting yourself, and you are the only review of
what you did, I don't have a lot of confidence at my blind spots are being
covered.”
Figure 28 shows raw counts for culture sentiments expressed by Wing Commanders.
There is a good indication here that the Wing Commander view is that there has not been much
culture change as of yet.
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Wing Commander Culture Sentiments
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Figure 28 – Wing Commander Culture Sentiments
Inspector General Personnel
Inspector General Personnel are not under the impression that AFIS is complete in its
culture change mission to reduce inspection prep. Figure 29 indicates that IGIs view a non-trivial
amount of difference between reserve units and active duty units, where reserve units are still
trying to stick to their previous model of preparing for inspection immediately prior to the
inspection. MAJCOM IGI personnel had this to say when asked if they were seeing reductions in
inspection prep type actions:
“I'd say we still have a way to go, especially in our Air National Guard units.
There are some pretty strong indications that a lot of them still put a ton of effort
into getting ready for the inspections. We are making incremental progress, what
challenges us most in turning concept into reality is the lack of capacity to
actually do continual evaluation over the 5-year cycle for guard units and 2-year
cycle for active wings in terms of the steady-state you're always getting feedback
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from your functional stove pipe and a bunch of feedback at the capstone, so we
still have that problem of most of the Wings feedback is coming in two doses,
midpoint and a capstone. And what they're getting from the over the horizon
continual evaluation it's still pretty thin so that's the biggest thing that probably
still allows Wings to still live in the model of we can let things degrade to a
degree and then just bump up the level of performance to please inspectors when
they get there.”

IG Personnel Culture Sentiments
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Figure 29 – IG Personnel Culture Sentiments
Overall
The IG and Wing Commander groups view the culture as largely the same as before the
implementation of AFIS. Squadron Commanders and Program Managers state that there has
been a change in culture and the way they approach inspection. Wing commanders and IG
personnel view units that will ramp up prior to inspections, which they believe go against the
goals and aims of operationalizing inspection. Squadron level personnel believe that the ramp up
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is minimal and should be done to prevent losing face to outside organizations, and is simply
human nature, however there has been a massive reduction in time spent on preparing for
inspection as compared to the previous system.

Investigative Question #4
How much of the responsibility of inspection has been moved back to unit commanders
as a result of the implementation of AFIS?
This question can be answered by recording two standalone codes. The first asked if
inspection belonged to commanders, meaning do the activities required to conduct inspection
reside at the commander’s level. The second code asked if the responsibility belonged to
commanders to conduct inspection. This was aimed at determining if the authorities existed at
the commander level to execute these inspections.
Based on these codes, Figure 30 is a normalized count look at how often interviewees
agreed/disagreed that the responsibility for inspection belonged to commanders code and with
the inspection is a commanders responsibility code. There is consensus among all groups that the
responsibility and the de facto reality is that commanders are able and have the responsibility to
conduct meaningful inspections on their units.
One IG member stated that “between 90-201, 1-1, and direction from CSAF on down, it’s
clear that inspection is a commander’s responsibility. The key difference of why this AFIS is
better than the previous IS comes from the breakdown in the taboo about admitting deficiencies.
Hiding your deficiencies from the inspector did not help anyone, but now there’s no point in
hiding because they should have been documented a long time ago. The old model didn’t allow
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that. It brought more fear than actual compliance. The here to help wasn't really a true statement
under the old way, now it is a true statement."

Normalized Inspection Codes
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Inspection does not belong to commanders
Inspection does belong to commanders

Figure 30 – Normalized Occurrence of Inspection Codes

Risk-based decision making was also examined. AFIS is mandated to promote risk-based
decision making at the command level as a means of deciding which inspectable activities will
fall “below the line”. These are activities that will not be completed in accordance with
regulations after consideration by leadership, and the application of some form of risk analysis.
Codes were developed to see whether or not risk based decision making was occurring in the
field.
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Figure 31 – Normalized Occurrence of Risk Based Decision Making is Happening
Figure 31 shows that risk-based decision making is much more on the minds of IG and
squadron commanders than it is on program managers, however it is not mentioned by wing
commanders at all. There is another concern here, however. When all of the squadron level
personnel (squadron commanders and program managers) were queried as to the number of
waivers they had submitted, all 12 responded that there were no waivers in the system. This
option to not submit waivers and just deal with write-ups circumvents the risk based system that
AFIS tries to promote. This is summed up by one squadron commander:
“Because the system does not increase workload over the previous model, I
haven't felt the need to go in and try to improve the system by working with the
functional.”
Program Managers
When program managers are broken out and asked if inspection responsibility lies with
the commander, they overwhelmingly respond affirmatively. But when asked if a risk-based
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approach is taken to decision making, Figure 32 shows there is almost a 2 to 1 negative response.
This possibly represents the portion of culture change that senior leaders need to target an AF
wide education campaign as to what “embracing the red” really means.
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Figure 32 – Program Manager Responsibility Codes

Squadron Commanders
Squadron commanders are much more positive in their assessment that risk based
decision making is occurring than the program managers (Figure 33). However, when they were
asked directly as to the reason why they hadn’t submitted waivers to the IG for programs, they
all responded that they were under the impression that the process was fairly simple, however
they just hadn’t felt the need to go through the process. It seemed easier for them to have certain
write-ups that they could address in their own time.
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Responsibility Codes
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Inspection does belong to
commanders

Inspection is a commanders Risk based decisionmaking is
responsibility
happening

Squadron Commander Agree

Squadron Commander Disagree

Figure 33 – Squadron Commander Responsibility Codes
When asked the question about whether or not AFIS moved the responsibility to them as
opposed to the previous model of inspection, many commanders felt that the responsibility was
always on them to accomplish inspection. One commander that had experience being inspected
under both regimes summed it up this way:
"I'm unfamiliar with what they were trying to fix with the new inspection system,
I hate to say. I'm not sure what they were trying to fix, cause I never saw a
problem with the old system."
Wing Commanders
Wing commanders feel that fairly strongly that inspection belongs to commanders at all
levels at a 2 to 1 level as shown in Figure 34. When asked if we could have received the benefits
of the current AFIS from the old system, one wing commander responded:
“I would say it does accomplish that goal, and the old system probably would not
have gotten those benefits. The commander's definitely feel more of a burden and
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empowerment perhaps to inspect themselves. I think we won't know if it was
worth it until we get a sense of those blind spots and the other work that ain't
being done because he shifted that workload from the MAJCOM down to the
commanders.”

Responsibility Codes
3

2

1

0

Inspection does belong to
commanders

Inspection is a commanders Risk based decisionmaking is
responsibility
happening

Wing Commander Agree

Wing Commander Disagree

Figure 34 – Wing Commander Responsibility Codes

Inspector General Personnel
IG personnel had high levels of agreement with the code Risk-based decision making is
happening (Figure 35). They applied a risk based model in their preparations to conduct UEIs.
They view Continual Evaluation conducted by the 2-letter staff as an integral piece to risk-based
analysis and in moving the responsibility of inspection to the commander by providing
information to them during the inspectable periods and outside of it as well.
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Responsibility Codes
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Inspection does belong to
commanders

Inspection is a commanders Risk based decisionmaking is
responsibility
happening
IG Positive

IG Negative

Figure 35 – Inspector General Responsibility Codes

When asked about whether or not the responsibility for inspection had been moved to the
commander, this IGI member stated:
“We've made inspection a commander responsibility. Where we still need to help
commanders is in getting them resources to accomplish that, whether that’s
through funded IG positions or SAPMs”
Overall
There is consensus among all groups that the responsibility and the de facto reality is that
commanders are able and have the responsibility to conduct meaningful inspections on their
units. This is a result of regulatory changes within AFI 1-1 and AFI 90-201, as well as cultural
changes such as having CIMB meetings at the wing monthly putting the responsibility for
inspection on squadron commanders.
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Investigative Question #5
In what ways can HHQ utilize system data to provide the field with actionable guidance to meet
HHQ priorities?
Continual Evaluation and constant feedback to the unit is a hallmark to AFIS. Based on
the overall response received from interviewee’s, we can see that the field is happy
communicating up the chain as needed. The two trouble areas highlighted in Figure 36 show
issues with the perceived level of expertise on the staff and the quality of the guidance that is
received from staffs.
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Normalized HHQ Relationship Code Counts
Expertise on the staff is lacking
Expertise on staff is adequate
There are ways to improve guidance, just not through
system
There are not many ways to improve guidance through
system
There are many ways to improve guidance through
system
AFIS does not stress going through chain
AFIS stresses going through chain
Functionals do help
Functionals do not help
Guidance is adequate
Guidance is inadequate
Field does understand process
Field does not understand process
Field is understanding of write ups
Field fights every single write up
HHQ is helpful with guidance
HHQ is not helpful with guidance
Help is provided with writeups
Not Getting help with writeups
0
Wing Commander

2

4

Squadron Commander

6

8

10

Program Manager

12

14

16

18

20

IG

Figure 36 – Normalized HHQ Relationship Codes Across All Groups
Program Managers
Program managers tend to believe that communicating with their wing IGs and other
HHQ agencies is the real way to ensure that progress can be made in ensuring that the guidance
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being provided is actionable by the field. They do see that the cuts to the MAJCOM staffs has
depleted the expertise that was there before, but also see that functionals are still trying to
provide relevant help where they can (Figure 37).

Program Manager HHQ Relationship Codes
Expertise on staff is adequate
There are ways to improve guidance, just not through system
There are many ways to improve guidance through system
AFIS stresses going through chain
Functionals do help
Guidance is adequate
Field does understand process
Field is understanding of write ups
HHQ is helpful with guidance
Help is provided with writeups
0
Program Manager Disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Program Manager Agree

Figure 37 - Program Manager HHQ Relationship Codes
One program manager described the possibility of using system data to improve guidance
this way:
“I think the checklists do provide a good sight picture that could tell HAF or
someone else what the operational situation is in the field, but again, it depends on
what’s being put into the system. If they come out and do a SAV and come to find
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out that we haven’t been doing our stuff right and it drives a undetected noncompliance, then they’re more likely to discount what’s provided in the systems”
Squadron Commanders
Figure 38 shows that squadron commanders are evenly split as to whether or not the
guidance coming from headquarters is helpful. They are also slightly negative in their perception
that it is possible to improve the system through the feedback provided in self-assessments.

Squadron Commander HHQ Relationship Codes
Expertise on staff is adequate
There are ways to improve guidance, just not through system
There are many ways to improve guidance through system
AFIS stresses going through chain
Functionals do help
Guidance is adequate
Field does understand process
Field is understanding of write ups
HHQ is helpful with guidance
Help is provided with writeups
0
Squadron Commander Disagree

2

4

6

8

10

12

Squadron Commander Agree

Figure 38 - Squadron Commander HHQ Relationship Codes
One commander strongly feels that MAJCOMs could improve guidance based on input
from the field, but doesn't believe they are taking that input into account when developing
policy:
"I think they could, but my question is are they?"
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This sentiment is echoed by another commander describing their experience when they
went through an inspection where the MAJCOM IG came down, but did not have much of an
interaction with them:
"We just had an inspection, and it was so insignificant I'm not really sure whether
or not it was the IG...They do have some knowledgeable people, but they're just
not out and about enough for me to tell you whether or not it’s worth it.
Wing Commanders
The wing commanders interviewed were of the opinion that the manning situation at the
staff has a lot to do with the quality of response provided by staff to actionable information
generated in the system. If the staffs are overwhelmed by tasks and undermanned, then the first
activity not to be done is continual evaluation. Therefore, it becomes absolutely imperative for
the field to be talking directly to the staff to get guidance concerns addressed, outside of the
system. This can be seen in their responses (Figure 39).
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Wing Commander HHQ Relationship Codes
Expertise on staff is adequate
There are ways to improve guidance, just not through system
There are many ways to improve guidance through system
AFIS stresses going through chain
Functionals do help
Guidance is adequate
Field does understand process
Field is understanding of write ups
HHQ is helpful with guidance
0
Wing Commander Disagree

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

Wing Commander Agree

Figure 39 - Wing Commander HHQ Relationship Codes
When asked what they believe drives the inadequate guidance provided by the staff, a
wing commander responded:
“I think it's more the stove piping we've done of authority into the functionals.
There's so much that is out of the Commander's hands, but to be honest with you
ACC doesn't have much of a say in it. So much of this stuff is written into AFI by
functionals out of the Commander's hands, leave in the commander with a whole
lot of accountability but not a lot of responsibility. So, stuff goes wrong he's
getting fired, but she doesn't have a lot of capability to affect those things. And I
don't think the system is getting that. But conceivably it could, because there is a
process to get a waiver follow it through that would do it, but it's not track very
well. It took four-star involvement to figure out where all the waivers are and
who's tracking them. Because enough of the ACC Wing Commanders put in the
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3.5

COMACC quarterly report to the commander of ACC that we had a whole bunch
of waivers just sitting out here and no one could tell us where they're at. That led
to him energizing the staff.”
Inspector General Personnel
IG personnel do not tend to use the information provided in the self-assessment systems
as a tool to improve 90-201. There are staffs that acknowledge there would be value in analyzing
those systems to try to find improvements, but with the inspection schedule they find that they
are undermanned to accomplish those sorts of projects. They do see a difference in AD and
reserve components in the quality of responses, and they does create a bit of bias at the staff to
want to try to get more information from the units during their inspection than would be
normally the case with the information that they have access to virtually. One IGI member
summed this up this way:
"It’s not just strictly MICT or IGEMS, because some folks just...the stuff they put
into MICT is just not very reliable"
Figure 40 highlights the perception that IG personnel have that their role is to assist
wings in their operation of AFIS. They believe their role is to provide guidance wherever
possible to get the commanders intent accomplished through the system. A member of SAF/IG
stated that their role was to:
"…provide guidance to the MAJCOMs to ensure that the policy that we're putting
out meets the intent of SECAF, CSAF, as well as help the MAJCOMS
commanders to perform their duties."
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IG Personnel HHQ Relationship Codes
Expertise on staff is adequate
There are ways to improve guidance, just not through system
There are many ways to improve guidance through system
AFIS stresses going through chain
Functionals do help
Guidance is adequate
Field does understand process
Field is understanding of write ups
HHQ is helpful with guidance
Help is provided with writeups
0
IG Disagree

2

4

6

8

10

IG Agree

Figure 40 - IG Personnel HHQ Relationship Codes
Overall
Continual Evaluation and constant feedback to the unit is a hallmark to AFIS. Based on
the overall response received from interviewee’s, we can see that the field is communicating up
the chain as needed. There is strong indication that the IG and staff functionals are not using this
information to improve policy however. This is based on lack of personnel conducting analysis
at the staff level, and a general distrust of the information input into the system to begin with.
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V. Conclusion and Recommendations
Overview
Lt Gen Rogers, SAF/IG, stated in the March 12 TIG Brief that: “Adequate assessment
and reporting without being overly burdensome or disruptive to the organization’s or unit’s
ability to complete its mission is an important component of a disciplined military force.”
(Rogers, 2012).With that in mind, understanding whether or not the implementation of AFIS met
the requirement it was set to accomplish will go a long way in ensuring that our system does all
that Lt Gen Rogers demanded of the Air Force. The next paragraphs will go into further detail
the resolution of the investigative questions, recommended actions, further research
opportunities, and implications.

Conclusions of Research
Investigative Questions 1 – How rigorous is AFIS?
The rigor provided by AFIS meets the statutory requirement set by AF leaders. Most
individuals in all stakeholder groups readily admit that there could easily be more rigor provided.
However, as the primary mission of our squadrons is not to satisfy the IG, most units act in a
satisficing manner in most cases. There are wide rigor differences detected between active duty
and guard/reserve units with active duty outperforming the guard/reserves. These differences are
mostly attributed to lack of experience and different rates of adoption of the culture of
“operationalizing” the inspection mindset.
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Investigative Questions 2 – AFIS Meeting Statutory Requirements
Title 10’s readiness reporting requirement is not fully met with the input provided by
AFIS. Most of the readiness data required is still provided by all of the other reporting tools
(ART, SORTS, DRRS, AF-IT, etc.) levied against commanders at all levels. Further, based on
the delegation of authorities down to Wing commanders, some of our nuclear, biological, and
chemical warfighting skills have atrophied since the implementation of AFIS. Specifically, as the
AF has authorized wing commanders to select what mission assurance activities satisfy the AFI
90-201, Table 5.2 requirement, they have tended to act in that satisficing fashion.
Fundamentally, the principle tool used by the MAJCOMs to evaluate Wings is focused
on non-readiness activities, namely evaluating the wings ability to evaluate itself on compliance
items. The wing is focused on non-readiness activities, namely the Groups and Squadrons
abilities to evaluate themselves on compliance items. The net result is there is no product
generated from the AFIS implementation that addresses our readiness to respond.
Investigative Questions 3 – Inspection preparation reduction
Changing the culture around inspection preparation was an excellent goal put forward by
SAF/IG in 2012. To date, there is agreement at the squadron and program manager level that
AFIS has accomplished just that. They readily express that their unit has “embraced the red”, do
not engage in overt inspection preparation, and have operationalized the AFIS mindset.
At the Wing and MAJCOM IG level however, individuals respond that the culture
change has been very uneven, especially between guard and active duty wings. They view the
differences in experience being a principle culprit to not embracing the philosophy, but they also
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believe that the different timelines that each component uses adds to hesitation to adopt the
mindset.
Investigative Questions 4 - Commander inspection responsibility and authority
AFI 1-2, Commander’s Responsibilities provides that commanders have the legal
authority and responsibility to inspect their subordinates and subordinate units. A robust
commander’s inspection program finds deficiencies and improves mission readiness. Part of this
effort must be a self-assessment program where individual Airmen report their compliance with
guidance (USAF, 2014). Across all stakeholder groups, there is agreement that AFIS has met this
goal. Commanders have the tools and expertise available to accomplish a robust inspection
program. Where the evidence deviates from the views expressed, however, is in the
implementation. Commanders have the capability to waive off requirements that they view do
not pay off in terms of mission accomplishment after a risk analysis has been conducted. Of all
the units interviewed, none had accomplished an analysis of this type, or had plans to. This
indicates that there is still some education as to what commander’s responsibilities and
authorities mean.
Investigative Questions 5 – Improving guidance through AFIS systems
The various IT systems utilized by AFIS do provide a capability to provide input into the
staff as it accomplishes its policy writing mission. Individuals at the squadron and program
management level don’t see that information being utilized in that fashion, however. Individuals
at the Wing and IG level believe that the staff cuts at the MAJCOM level prevents Continual
Evaluation from being accomplished. This results in all that actionable data not being used in
formulating good policy for the field.
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Future Research Opportunities
This study looked primarily at MXG and MSG type squadrons in ACC and AMC. A
much wider analysis would be able to detect if these issues are isolated in those 2 commands.
Additionally, Wing IG personnel were not polled in this study, they could be targeted in future
research. Further, text mining techniques could be applied to the comments provided in MICT
and IGEMS to see if there are any trends that would indicate any sorts of undetected
noncompliance issues.

Recommended Actions
Meeting the intent of the PAD should be the priority for any program that receives taxpayer funds. In order to meet the readiness reporting deficiencies indicated by this research, the
AF should begin including a Wing level readiness inspection, either through parts or as a wing as
a whole, as part of future versions of AFIS. Further, educating commanders at all levels what
risk-based analysis means when conducting CCIP would pay dividends by providing staffs with
data on what activities are being waived by the field, and what activities are simply difficult to
stay in compliance with.
Part of this study asked interviewees what aspects of AFIS they would change if they
were in charge of the program. These responses are below in Table 12 in Appendix C, however
among the more feasible improvements include generating a list of waivers available to wings,
groups, and squadrons based on mission types. For example, a list of common waivers could be
provided to Air Base Wing commanders as a potential “menu” of options that the commander
would apply their judgement and experience against.
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A separate suggestion was to make the activities to be inspected in table 5.2 of AFI 90201 much more tailorable. This would allow MAJCOM IGs to apply their own risk-based
analysis in determining the composition of the team that gets sent out on inspection and allow for
better data to be provided to the unit to improve.
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Appendix A – IRB Exemption Letter
-
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Appendix B – Initial Interview Guides
INTERVIEW GUIDE: WING COMMANDER
Introduction (~3 mins)
Hi, ____________, my name is Capt Luis Rosado-Medina, and I am a Master’s Student in
Logistics and Supply Chain Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. How are you
doing today?
 Thanks for agreeing to talk with me, and thanks for your time. The purpose of this interview is
to ask you some questions about the work your organization does assessing the readiness,
discipline, and efficiency of the units assigned to your command. This interview is part of my
research on the impact that the AFIS has had since the implementation of AFPD13-01. I would
like you to think of it as an open conversation, rather free flowing, about the various
requirements that AFIS fulfills, the previous model of inspection, and the nature of inspection in
general. It won't take more than 1 hour but less time is of course ok.
Now, since it is an academic interview, you have some special rights as a respondent:
•

All the information you give me today will be treated confidentially.
o Your name and your organization’s name will not be linked to any answer.
o I am having similar discussions with multiple stakeholders in this area, including
individuals from other commands, and at the Wing and Squadron level. Any
insights or take-aways from our conversation will be reported as originating from
the stakeholder group and not a specific person unit, unless you give me
permission to do so.

•

The interview is voluntary, which means:
o You have the right to decline to answer any particular question,
o And you can stop the interview at any time.

•

I now request your permission to record the interview, if that's OK with you. 
o You have the right to stop the recording at any time.
o The recording will be kept in an encrypted digital file, guarded by me personally.
o All copies will be destroyed once our research project is complete.

Do you have any questions?  (Answer the questions, if any). Let's proceed.
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Positioning questions (~5-10 minutes):
1) Can you tell me a bit about your organization’s background and primary focus?
1a) What is the scope in terms of different types of activities supported?
1b) Where they operate – regional or country specific
1c) The overall budget and size of their operations
2) How would you describe MAJCOM IGs role in the area of inspection?
4a) As a authority for assessment?
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?
3) How would you describe your wing’s IG role in this area?
4a) As a authority for assessment?
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?
Focused Questions (~30-45 minutes):

1. Title 10 spells out various requirements that the AF is responsible to report to the
congress on, in your opinion, how well does the current AFIS meet these requirements?
*** If need be, prompt with the following questions:
o Specifically, are readiness problems, readiness assessments, risk assessment of
dependence on contractor support, combat support and related agencies assessment,
major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates reported on adequately by our
current system?
o How has the implementation of the current system improved or degraded our
reporting capability?

2. One of the key justifications for transitioning to the new AFIS was to reduce the amount
of inspection prep that was occurring in the field, how do you think AFIS has done in this
regard?
o
o
o
o

Have functionals given you any input into this area?
Has your prep workload diminished as a result of AFIS?
Have there been any increases in certain areas (nuclear, NWRM, etc.)?
Any other impacts from AFIS on time spent on inspection?

3. Trying to bring the responsibility of inspection to unit commanders is a cornerstone to
AFI 90-201. What about the implementation of AFIS accomplishes this goal?
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o Do you think we could have gotten those benefits in the previous model of
inspection?

4. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their selfassessments?
o Is it:
a. Providing in-depth information about the various programs?
b. Determining whether or not the unit is truly prepared to accomplish its wartime
mission?
c. In what ways could the current system be improved to increase rigor, and do you
think it’s necessary to do this?

5. Does the current system provide good feedback to HHQ on the conditions in the field that
would lead to improvements in policy and guidance?

6. In terms of inspection frequency, are you satisfied with the frequency of unit inspections?
o What’s your rationale for this opinion?
7. In terms of working with our Total Force partners, is there good integration into those
components for reporting effectiveness?

During the course of this conversation, try to move the conversation from the individuals to the
organization’s overall strategy and how it has positioned itself in the SC / Financing realm. Try
to keep it anchored on how financing decisions are made and how the outcomes are measured.
•

For interesting things, ask: “Tell me more about X”.

•

When the respondent is getting vague, ask: “Can you give me an example of X?”
(Especially important for successful or unsuccessful programs or operations. Make sure
their definition of success is outlined).

•

If the conversation is getting lost in operational details, ask: "What is the purpose of
this?", or "What is the philosophy/idea behind this?"
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•

If the conversation is getting too strategic, ask: "How do you implement this?", or "How
do you ensure this happens", or "How do you enable this?” depending on the subject.

Strategic / Open section (~5-15 minutes)
(Note: All these questions are optional. Ask only those that seem relevant to the position and that
have not been answered before during the course of the conversation.)
1. Opportunities and challenges (ask together if deemed appropriate):
o What would you say is the biggest opportunities facing the Air Force in terms of
reporting effectiveness today?
o What would you say is the biggest challenge facing your organization in this realm?
2. What do you see as an area or need that is not currently being addressed by AFIS? Or,
maybe not being addressed on a large enough scale?
3. What do you see as an unsung success of the current system?
Thank you very much for your time and that's pretty much what I had to ask you. The formal
portion of our discussion is over, and I’m turning off the recorder.
o Are there any points you would like to add or do you have any feedback for me? I
really appreciate your answers and your time. Would you happen to have any contacts
that you think would be interesting in having a similar conversation?
I hope I can contact you with follow up questions after I have analyzed our conversation. I’ll
send a copy of the interview transcript if you would like to review our conversation. Thanks
again!
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INTERVIEW GUIDE: SQUADRON COMMANDER
Introduction (~3 mins)
Hi, ____________, my name is Capt Luis Rosado-Medina, and I am a Master’s Student in
Logistics and Supply Chain Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. How are you
doing today?
 Thanks for agreeing to talk with me, and thanks for your time. The purpose of this interview is
to ask you some questions about the work your organization does assessing the readiness,
discipline, and efficiency of the units assigned to your command. This interview is part of my
research on the impact that the AFIS has had since the implementation of AFPD13-01. I would
like you to think of it as an open conversation, rather free flowing, about the various
requirements that AFIS fulfills, the previous model of inspection, and the nature of inspection in
general. It won't take more than 1 hour but less time is of course ok.
Now, since it is an academic interview, you have some special rights as a respondent:
•

All the information you give me today will be treated confidentially.
o Your name and your organization’s name will not be linked to any answer.
o I am having similar discussions with multiple stakeholders in this area, including
individuals from other commands, and at the Wing and Squadron level. Any
insights or take-aways from our conversation will be reported as originating from
the stakeholder group and not a specific person unit, unless you give me
permission to do so.

•

The interview is voluntary, which means:
o You have the right to decline to answer any particular question,
o And you can stop the interview at any time.

•

I now request your permission to record the interview, if that's OK with you. 
o You have the right to stop the recording at any time.
o The recording will be kept in an encrypted digital file, guarded by me personally.
o All copies will be destroyed once our research project is complete.

Do you have any questions?  (Answer the questions, if any). Let's proceed.
Positioning questions (~5-10 minutes):
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1) Can you tell me a bit about your organization’s background and primary focus?
1a) What is the scope in terms of different types of activities supported?
1b) Where they operate – regional or country specific
1c) The overall budget and size of their operations
2) How would you describe MAJCOM IGs role in the area of inspection?
4a) As a authority for assessment?
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?
3) How would you describe your wing’s IG role in this area?
4a) As a authority for assessment?
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?
Focused Questions (~30-45 minutes):

1. Title 10 spells out various requirements that the AF is responsible to report to the
congress on, in your opinion, how well does the current AFIS meet these
requirements?
*** If need be, prompt with the following questions:
o Specifically, are readiness problems, readiness assessments, risk assessment of
dependence on contractor support, combat support and related agencies assessment,
major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates reported on adequately by our
current system?
o How has the implementation of the current system improved or degraded our
reporting capability?

2. One of the key justifications for transitioning to the new AFIS was to reduce the amount
of inspection prep that was occurring in the field, how do you think AFIS has done in this
regard?
o
o
o
o

Have functionals given you any input into this area?
Has your prep workload diminished as a result of AFIS?
Have there been any increases in certain areas (nuclear, NWRM, etc.)?
Any other impacts from AFIS on time spent on inspection?

3. Trying to bring the responsibility of inspection to unit commanders is a cornerstone to
AFI 90-201. What about the implementation of AFIS accomplishes this goal?
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o Do you think we could have gotten those benefits in the previous model of
inspection?

4. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their selfassessments?
o Is it:
d. Providing in-depth information about the various programs?
e. Determining whether or not the unit is truly prepared to accomplish its wartime
mission?
f. In what ways could the current system be improved to increase rigor, and do you
think it’s necessary to do this?

5. Does the current system provide good feedback to HHQ on the conditions in the field that
would lead to improvements in policy and guidance?

6. In terms of inspection frequency, are you satisfied with the frequency of unit inspections?
o What’s your rationale for this opinion?
7. In terms of working with our Total Force partners, is there good integration into those
components for reporting effectiveness?
o How much time do you need to devote to accomplish this?

During the course of this conversation, try to move the conversation from the individuals to the
organization’s overall strategy and how it has positioned itself in the SC / Financing realm. Try
to keep it anchored on how financing decisions are made and how the outcomes are measured.
•

For interesting things, ask: “Tell me more about X”.

•

When the respondent is getting vague, ask: “Can you give me an example of X?”
(Especially important for successful or unsuccessful programs or operations. Make sure
their definition of success is outlined).

•

If the conversation is getting lost in operational details, ask: "What is the purpose of
this?", or "What is the philosophy/idea behind this?"
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•

If the conversation is getting too strategic, ask: "How do you implement this?", or "How
do you ensure this happens", or "How do you enable this?” depending on the subject.

Strategic / Open section (~5-15 minutes)
(Note: All these questions are optional. Ask only those that seem relevant to the position and that
have not been answered before during the course of the conversation.)
1. Opportunities and challenges (ask together if deemed appropriate):
o What would you say is the biggest opportunities facing the Air Force in terms of
reporting effectiveness today?
o What would you say is the biggest challenge facing your organization in this realm?
2. What do you see as an area or need that is not currently being addressed by AFIS? Or,
maybe not being addressed on a large enough scale?
3. What do you see as an unsung success of the current system?
4. How would you change the system?
Thank you very much for your time and that's pretty much what I had to ask you. The formal
portion of our discussion is over, and I’m turning off the recorder.
o Are there any points you would like to add or do you have any feedback for me? I
really appreciate your answers and your time. Would you happen to have any contacts
that you think would be interesting in having a similar conversation?
I hope I can contact you with follow up questions after I have analyzed our conversation. I’ll
send a copy of the interview transcript if you would like to review our conversation. Thanks
again!
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INTERVIEW GUIDE: PROGRAM MANAGER
Introduction (~3 mins)
Hi, ____________, my name is Capt Luis Rosado-Medina, and I am a Master’s Student in
Logistics and Supply Chain Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. How are you
doing today?
 Thanks for agreeing to talk with me, and thanks for your time. The purpose of this interview is
to ask you some questions about the work your organization does assessing the readiness,
discipline, and efficiency of the units assigned to your command. This interview is part of my
research on the impact that the AFIS has had since the implementation of AFPD13-01. I would
like you to think of it as an open conversation, rather free flowing, about the various
requirements that AFIS fulfills, the previous model of inspection, and the nature of inspection in
general. It won't take more than 1 hour but less time is of course ok.
Now, since it is an academic interview, you have some special rights as a respondent:
•

All the information you give me today will be treated confidentially.
o Your name and your organization’s name will not be linked to any answer.
o I am having similar discussions with multiple stakeholders in this area, including
individuals from other commands, and at the Wing and Squadron level. Any
insights or take-aways from our conversation will be reported as originating from
the stakeholder group and not a specific person unit, unless you give me
permission to do so.

•

The interview is voluntary, which means:
o You have the right to decline to answer any particular question,
o And you can stop the interview at any time.

•

I now request your permission to record the interview, if that's OK with you. 
o You have the right to stop the recording at any time.
o The recording will be kept in an encrypted digital file, guarded by me personally.
o All copies will be destroyed once our research project is complete.

Do you have any questions?  (Answer the questions, if any). Let's proceed.
Positioning questions (~5-10 minutes):
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1) Can you tell me a bit about your organization’s background and primary focus?
1a) What is the scope in terms of different types of activities supported?
1b) Where they operate – regional or country specific

2) How would you describe MAJCOM IGs role in the area of inspection?
4a) As a authority for assessment?
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?
3) How would you describe your wing’s IG role in this area?
4a) As a authority for assessment?
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?
Focused Questions (~30-45 minutes):

1. Transitioning from the previous inspection model, what were the unexpected
impediments you faced? Unexpected benefits?
*** If need be, prompt with the following questions:
o Do you feel that training for the self-assessment aspect of CCIP is adequate
throughout the field?
o In your self-assessment responses, do you feel they adequately represent the status of
your program?

2. One of the key justifications for transitioning to the new AFIS was to reduce the amount
of inspection prep that was occurring in the field, how do you think AFIS has done in this
regard?
o
o
o
o

Have functionals given you any input into this area?
Has your prep workload diminished as a result of AFIS?
Have there been any increases in certain areas (nuclear, NWRM, etc.)?
Any other impacts from AFIS on time spent on inspection?

3. Trying to bring the responsibility of inspection to unit commanders is a cornerstone to
AFI 90-201. What about the implementation of AFIS accomplishes this goal?
o Do you think we could have gotten those benefits in the previous model of
inspection?
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4. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their selfassessments?
o Is it:
g. Providing in-depth information about the various programs?
h. Determining whether or not the unit is truly prepared to accomplish its wartime
mission?
i. In what ways could the current system be improved to increase rigor, and do you
think it’s necessary to do this?

5. Does the current system provide good feedback to HHQ on the conditions in the field that
would lead to improvements in policy and guidance?

6. In terms of inspection frequency, are you satisfied with the frequency of unit inspections?
o What’s your rationale for this opinion?
7. In terms of working with our Total Force partners, is there good integration into those
components for reporting effectiveness?

During the course of this conversation, try to move the conversation from the individuals to the
organization’s overall strategy and how it has positioned itself in the SC / Financing realm. Try
to keep it anchored on how financing decisions are made and how the outcomes are measured.
•

For interesting things, ask: “Tell me more about X”.

•

When the respondent is getting vague, ask: “Can you give me an example of X?”
(Especially important for successful or unsuccessful programs or operations. Make sure
their definition of success is outlined).

•

If the conversation is getting lost in operational details, ask: "What is the purpose of
this?", or "What is the philosophy/idea behind this?"

•

If the conversation is getting too strategic, ask: "How do you implement this?", or "How
do you ensure this happens", or "How do you enable this?” depending on the subject.

Strategic / Open section (~5-15 minutes)
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(Note: All these questions are optional. Ask only those that seem relevant to the position and that
have not been answered before during the course of the conversation.)
1. Opportunities and challenges (ask together if deemed appropriate):
o What would you say is the biggest opportunities facing the Air Force in terms of
reporting effectiveness today?
o What would you say is the biggest challenge facing your organization in this realm?
2. What do you see as an area or need that is not currently being addressed by AFIS? Or,
maybe not being addressed on a large enough scale?
3. What do you see as an unsung success of the current system?
Thank you very much for your time and that's pretty much what I had to ask you. The formal
portion of our discussion is over, and I’m turning off the recorder.
o Are there any points you would like to add or do you have any feedback for me? I
really appreciate your answers and your time. Would you happen to have any contacts
that you think would be interesting in having a similar conversation?
I hope I can contact you with follow up questions after I have analyzed our conversation. I’ll
send a copy of the interview transcript if you would like to review our conversation. Thanks
again!
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INTERVIEW GUIDE: INSPECTOR GENERAL
Introduction (~3 mins)
Hi, ____________, my name is Capt Luis Rosado-Medina, and I am a Master’s Student in
Logistics and Supply Chain Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. How are you
doing today?
 Thanks for agreeing to talk with me, and thanks for your time. The purpose of this interview is
to ask you some questions about the work your organization does assessing the readiness,
discipline, and efficiency of the units assigned to your command. This interview is part of my
research on the impact that the AFIS has had since the implementation of AFPD13-01. I would
like you to think of it as an open conversation, rather free flowing, about the various
requirements that AFIS fulfills, the previous model of inspection, and the nature of inspection in
general. It won't take more than 1 hour but less time is of course ok.
Now, since it is an academic interview, you have some special rights as a respondent:
•

All the information you give me today will be treated confidentially.
o Your name and your organization’s name will not be linked to any answer.
o I am having similar discussions with multiple stakeholders in this area, including
individuals from other commands, and at the Wing and Squadron level. Any
insights or take-aways from our conversation will be reported as originating from
the stakeholder group and not a specific person unit, unless you give me
permission to do so.

•

The interview is voluntary, which means:
o You have the right to decline to answer any particular question,
o And you can stop the interview at any time.

•

I now request your permission to record the interview, if that's OK with you. 
o You have the right to stop the recording at any time.
o The recording will be kept in an encrypted digital file, guarded by me personally.
o All copies will be destroyed once our research project is complete.

Do you have any questions?  (Answer the questions, if any). Let's proceed.
Positioning questions (~5-10 minutes):
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1) Can you tell me a bit about your organization’s background and primary focus?
2a) What is the scope in terms of different types of activities supported?
2b) Where they operate – regional or country specific
2c) The overall budget and size of their operations
2) How would you describe MAJCOM IGs role in this area?
4a) As a authority for assessment?
4b) As an source of expertise in mission areas?
Focused Questions (~30-45 minutes):

1. Title 10 spells out various requirements that the AF is responsible to report to the
congress on, in your opinion, how well does the current AFIS meet these
requirements?
*** If need be, prompt with the following questions:
o Specifically, are readiness problems, readiness assessments, risk assessment of
dependence on contractor support, combat support and related agencies assessment,
major exercise assessments, and cannibalization rates reported on adequately by our
current system?
o How has the implementation of the current system improved or degraded our
reporting capability?

2. One of the key justifications for transitioning to the new AFIS was to reduce the amount
of inspection prep that was occurring in the field, how do you think AFIS has done in this
regard?
o
o
o
o

Have functional given you any input into this area?
Has your travel workload diminished as a result of AFIS?
Have there been any increases in certain areas (nuclear, NWRM, etc.)?
Any other impacts from AFIS on time spent on inspection?

3. Trying to bring the responsibility of inspection to unit commanders is a cornerstone to
AFI 90-201. What about the implementation of AFIS accomplishes this goal?
o Do you think we could have gotten those benefits in the previous model of
inspection?
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4. What is your opinion about the amount of rigor provided by units in their selfassessments?
o Is it:
j. Providing in-depth information about the various programs?
k. Determining whether or not the unit is truly prepared to accomplish its wartime
mission?
l. In what ways could the current system be improved to increase rigor, and do you
think it’s necessary to do this?

5. In developing policy solutions for the field, how frequently do you turn to system data in
MICT or IGEMS to assist?
o What are reasons that you do or do not rely on self-assessment comments or IGEMS
data?
6. In terms of inspection frequency, are you satisfied with the frequency of unit inspections?
o What’s your rationale for this opinion?
7. In terms of working with our Total Force partners, is there good integration into those
components for reporting effectiveness?

During the course of this conversation, try to move the conversation from the individuals to the
organization’s overall strategy and how it has positioned itself in the SC / Financing realm. Try
to keep it anchored on how financing decisions are made and how the outcomes are measured.
•

For interesting things, ask: “Tell me more about X”.

•

When the respondent is getting vague, ask: “Can you give me an example of X?”
(Especially important for successful or unsuccessful programs or operations. Make sure
their definition of success is outlined).

•

If the conversation is getting lost in operational details, ask: "What is the purpose of
this?", or "What is the philosophy/idea behind this?"

•

If the conversation is getting too strategic, ask: "How do you implement this?", or "How
do you ensure this happens", or "How do you enable this?” depending on the subject.

Strategic / Open section (~5-15 minutes)
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(Note: All these questions are optional. Ask only those that seem relevant to the position and that
have not been answered before during the course of the conversation.)
1. Opportunities and challenges (ask together if deemed appropriate):
o What would you say is the biggest opportunities facing the Air Force in terms of
reporting effectiveness today?
o What would you say is the biggest challenge facing your organization in this realm?
2. What do you see as an area or need that is not currently being addressed by AFIS? Or,
maybe not being addressed on a large enough scale?
3. What do you see as an unsung success of the current system?
Thank you very much for your time and that's pretty much what I had to ask you. The formal
portion of our discussion is over, and I’m turning off the recorder.
o Are there any points you would like to add or do you have any feedback for me? I
really appreciate your answers and your time. Would you happen to have any contacts
that you think would be interesting in having a similar conversation?
I hope I can contact you with follow up questions after I have analyzed our conversation. I’ll
send a copy of the interview transcript if you would like to review our conversation. Thanks
again!
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Appendix C – Tables
Table 12 – Recommendations for AFIS improvement from field
Program
Manager
Program
Manager
Squadron
Commander

Squadron
Commander

Wing
Commander

IG Personnel

IG Personnel

The only way to get a 100% assessment of how our units are operating would be to
do some sort of no-notice, like preinspection or something.
I feel that the Air Force Task List needs to be integrated into the communicators in
a way that gets at the capability of the unit, and not the compliance situation.
The communicators should be much more detailed beyond the requirements in the
AFI. They also feel that reverting to a semiannual requirement to report on selfassessments would increase the rigor of the system.
If I Were King for the day I would take a look at the inspection checklist
themselves to make sure that they are viable, their value added, and making sure
that we need to have that many questions. I understand that certain programs and
may dictate that like PRP or something like that, but there are certain programs
that I know if you have a 50-question MICT checklist that you can answer and
Ensure that you're in compliance with 10, that's what I would look I would try to
get that scrub down.
Here's an example, we were trying to determine what waivers to put forward and
we asked the question: why do we need to even invent this? Why don't we try what
all the air base wings in the Air Force are putting in for waivers? We should be
able to hit a button and get a list Instead of waiting for a good idea person to we
should wave this we should wave that. Also, the program ought to be able to hit a
button and get what all the issue areas are that wings like you have. Instead you
have to try to get you UEI reports, dig through those reports and see if any of them
apply to you. It would seem to me that this program ought to be able to do cross
organizational analysis better than what it does.
I would make Attachment 3 much more tailorable to the MAJCOM, instead of the
you must do this and you must do it all in the inspectable UEI period. In fact we're
trying to get GO support on this.
I would make the wing it position a post Squadron command vectored position as a
matter of development. The way we manage our IG’s so that you have a person
that's walked a mile in my shoes, has run a unit self-assessment program, and
understands the challenges associated with that, and can be a mentor to in addition
to providing validation to Squadron self-assessor programs. He’d be a peer mentor
to those Squadron Commanders as opposed to how it typically is done as someone
who's on the path to retirement, which was the old system, or now it's seems to be
gaining some traction where it's done pre-command for someone who is of
command caliber, who’s likely to go to command as a sort of spin up. I think you
get more out of it if you do it after the command experience.
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